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"If this country needs Paremoremo - as it 
may - then let's not kid ourselves that 
it's a place where criminals are fitted 
to return to the community as reformed 
citizens. 
Maximum security prisons may make it 
easier to incarcerate prisoners. They 
can do nothing to reform them . 
... (T)he whole concept of a maximum 
security prison is a concession to that 
element in public opinion which simply 
wants the whole problem of crime and the 
criminal to be swept under the rug." 
Editorial in The Tribune, December 15, 1968 
"Only time will show whether Paremoremo is 
an impersonal machine or a human one." 
The Auckland Star, December 7, 1968 
( i) 
INTRODUCTION 
Paremoremo Prison has probably attracted a 
good deal more public scrutiny and criticism than 
any other penal institution in this country, Mount 
Eden included. Its brief history has been char-
acterised by riots, unrest amongst inmates, frequent 
assaults on officers, and low staff morals. 
As Dr. Robson once noted, "a decision to erect 
a maximum security prison should never be taken 
lightly." This paper traces the development of 
Paremoremo Prison, and seeks to outline the various 
factorswhich ultimately influenced the concept, 
design, size and construction of the present 
institution. 
Section (1) 
New Zealand. 
is a brief analysis of penal policy in 
It is interesting to note that many of 
the problems encountered by penal administrators in 
New Zealand in the l960's were very similar to problems 
which prevailed in the 1860's. This section sets the 
theme for the rest of the paper. 
Section (2) deals with the proposed National Prison 
Centre at Waikeria. While the proposed scheme commands 
an important position in New Zealand penal history, it 
is not discussed here in a detailed manner. The 
information in this section has been culled from Annual 
Reports of the Justice Department, and, consequently, 
the section will add very little of interest to the 
reader, whose knowledge of New Zealand penal history 
is more than cursory. 
Section (3) is a study of Mount Eden Prison, from 
(ii) 
1949 until 1964. Any person associated with 
Mount Eden during the 1950's and 1960's will 
testify to its grave inadequacy as a modern penal 
institution. Much of the material in the section is 
based on newspaper reports and editorials, and on 
Annual Reports of the Justice Department. However, 
where the need has arisen, use has been made of 
some departmental files. 
Section (4) is the nucleus of this research paper. 
As far as is possible, this section attempts to 
plug the many holes in the sketchy history of 
Paremoremo. The information contained in this 
section may provide the answers to some queries; 
however, by the same measure, it will undoubtedly 
raise many more questions concerning the development 
of the prison. The material in this section is based 
on both public records and departmental files. 
Section (5) contains a conclusion to the research 
paper. The writer will attempt to deal with the many 
questions left unanswered, and will try to resolve 
the numerous difficulties which many students of penal 
history entertain about the institution. The second 
part of the section deals with some of the problems of 
maximum security imprisonment. 
Section (6) outlines briefly some of the events which 
have occurred at Paremoremo since its opening. The 
two inquiries conducted by Sir Guy Powles and Mr. L.G.H. 
Sinclair, S.M. will also be touched upon. The reader 
is asked to bear in mind that this section is merely a 
superficial examination; an entire research paper 
could be devoted to this section alone. 
The writer wishes to acknowledge the considerable help 
given by the Department of Justice (and Mr. D. McKenzie 
in particular)in granting access to departmental files. 
(iii) 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAREMOREMO PRISON 
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(6) PAREMOREMO 1969 - 1973 
. I 
(1) THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ZEALAND PENAL POLICY 
Penal policy hardly existed in the period before 1840. 
The treatment of crime was essentially quick and punitive. 
Indeed, the first recorded gaol in New Zealand was 'an old 
sea chest with air holes bored into it 
( 1) 
With the advent of British sovereignity in 1840, there 
was a wholesale importation into New Zealand of a vast array 
of British statute and common law, but little in the way of 
penal policy. During the first years of settlement, penal 
1. 
policy amounted to little more than "to execute the murderers, 
transport the worst criminals and build prisons that had some 
f h ' h ' d II (2) hope o olding t e remain er. Mayhew notes that: 
"the first gaols in the colony were largely 
facades The Wellington gaol was unlikely 
to offer much resistance to a prisoner intent 
upon escape. It was a hut made of 'toi-toi' 
and was erected on the Petone foreshore where 
it was barely distinguishable from the huts in 
the adjoining native village. Its 750 square 
feet were divided into a room for receiving 
prisoners, a gaoler'.s room, a small stove, and 
3 cells designed to accommodate no more than 7 
men ... The gaols in the other parts of the 
colony were not generally more satisfactory than 
that of Wellington." (3) 
1850 - 1880 
The establishment of the provincial system in 1853 
nullified any real opportunity of progress in penal policy. 
"The major characteristics of this period were: the lack 
of centralised administration; the lack of policy based on 
principle (in part a consequence of the first)/ the lack of 
a classification system; the lack of opportunities for 
rehabilitation; the lack of trained staff; the lack of 
prisons; 
( 4) 
1. 
2 • 
3. 
4 • 
P.K. Mayhew - The Penal System of New Zealand: 1840-1924 
Justice Department, 1959, p.l. 
E. Missen - "The History of New Zealand Penal Policy" - A 
paper given at a V.U.W. University Extension 
Seminar 1971, p.2. 
Mayhew, op.cit., pp. 2 - 3 
L.H. Atkins - The Development of New Zealand Penal Policy -
L.L.M. Criminology Seminar 1972, p.l. 
2 • 
The emphasis was on removing criminals from society: 
II offenders were an unknown quantity. Few people knew or 
cared about them. Classification was unknown. Men and 
women, adults and children, the sane and the lunatics, 
• h ' d • II (5) received the same treatment in t e same grim surroun ings. 
During these years the insecurity of the jails was 
constantly emphasised. While many realised the need for a 
central prison run by the government, to which all dangerous 
prisoners might be sent, no progress was made in this field. 
"Inevitably, if the gaol was insecure other precauti0ns had 
to be taken, and many of the penal servitude prisoners were 
kept in irons. Even so the escape rate was high. In Auckland 
10 prisoners escaped in the first 10 months of 1860 and only 
3 of them were recaptured. 
1862."(G) 
In Invercargill 10 escaped in 
Overcrowding in prisons was a serious problem. "Several 
inquiries and reports pointed to shocking conditions in 
Auckland and Dunedin gaols. In l862 the Judges reported on 
the Auckland Prison. Their criticisms were cogent, scathing 
and ignored. The same fate befell the recommendations of a 
Royal Commission in 1868. 
utterly indifferent."(?) 
Governments and the public were 
An attempt by the Prisons Act 1873 to standardise 
prison regulations and to set out the areas of jurisdiction 
of gaolers and Visiting Justices failed, since there was no 
agency to enforce it. In practice, penal administration 
reflected the views of individual gaolers and Visiting 
Justices, many of whom entertained 1'the firm belief that the 
aim of imprisonment was to punish and deter and discipline 
was its watchword. 11 ( 8 ) 
5 • 
6 • 
7 • 
8. 
Crime and the Community - Justice Department, 1964, p.11 
Mayhew, op.cit., p.18 
E. Missen, op.cit., p.4 
E. Missen, op.cit., p.4 
• 
1880 - 1908 
In December 1880, Colonel Arthur Hume, a senior officer 
in the English prison service, was appointed Inspector of 
Prisons, amidst a blaze of controversy. Hume's first report 
was extremely critical of the jails and recommended an 
immediate start on a central prison for 300 prisoners. Hume 
also suggested that the birch be introduced, and that prison 
diets be drastically revised, since prisoners left jail 
heavier than when they arrived - a situation "not calculated 
to make our prisons places to be dreaded." "The emphasis 
was to be on punishment and deterrence and Hume's authority 
( 9) 
overrode that of Visiting Justices and gaolers." 
Hume recognised the need to classify and separate 
prisoners. He believed that all association of prisoners 
was dangerous and undesirable. "It was Hume's intention 
to separate entirely the penal servitude and long-sentence 
hard labour prisoners from the remaining prisoners. This 
was, in his view, the first essential in any classification 
system, and was based upon the argument that the longer 
the sentence the more depraved and contagious is the 
. ( 10) 
prisoner." 
Hume attempted to implement a system of separating 
entirely certain classes of prisoners and completely 
denying prisoners the opportunity of communicating with one 
another, except, perhaps, during religious services. 
Unfortunately for Hume, II the system never really worked, 
mainly because it required as many different cells as there 
were prisoners, and this was a state of affairs which Hume 
did not experience until the last few years. In any event 
Hume considerably modified his views when he became 
enthusiastic about prison tree-planting camps where 
separation and silence were of course impossible."(ll) 
9. 
10. 
lL 
E. Missen, 
Mayhew, 
Mayhew, 
op.cit., p.8. 
op.cit., p.57 
op.cit., p.91 
3 • 
• 
4. 
By the time of Burne's resignation in 1908, "there 
was some uniformity of treatment, of rations, remission, 
gratuities, rules, regulations, punishments and privileges. 
A prisoner knew where he stood and what was expected of 
him. One discipline prevailed throughout the prisons."'
12
) 
1909 - 1950 
The Hurne regime was followed by Sir John Findlay's 
term as Minister of Justice. Findlay was convinced of 
the necessity of discarding the old penal system which 
he had inherited, and yet he was unable to ignore 
traditional priorities and regarded the task of the 
prisons administration as being primarily that of 
protecting the community from crime. Once that objective 
had been achieved, the welfare and reformation of the 
prisoner could then be considered. 
Findlay laid down the framework for the establishment 
of a more effective classification system. The 'new 
method' changed Burne's ideas of classification and 
decided to try and set apart a different institution for 
each group of prisoners. Speaking to the Crimes Amendment 
Bill in 1910, Findlay remarked: "When this Bill becomes 
law we will have a prison system as efficient as any 
existing anywhere in the world." 
Findlay also introduced the new measure of reformative 
detention. Instead of receiving, or in addition to 
receiving, a finite term of imprisonment, an offender 
might be sentenced to reformative detention for up to 3 
years by a Magistrate and up to 10 years by a Judge. A 
Prisons Board, checking or reviewing at least once a year, 
was to have the responsibility of releasing the prisoner 
12. Mayhew, op. cit., p.91 
• 
at any time during the sentence on determining that 
the prisoner had been reformed. 
It cannot be doubted that the sentence of 
reformative detention was a sorry farce. 
Mayhew, 
According to 
"The 'new method' of 1910 was potentially 
as advanced as any penal system in the 
world and, properly applied, it might 
have prevented a great deal of crime. 
The king-pin of the system, however, was 
the introduction of the semi-indeterminate 
sentence of reformative detention, and this 
form of sentence proved in practice to be 
a failure. Abused by the Courts, only 
partially implemented by the administration, 
misunderstood by the Prisons Board, it 
continued its sorry journey for 34 years, 
misleading the public and breaking faith 
with the prisoners." (.13) 
After the passing of the Findlay regime, there was 
virtually complete inactivity in penal reform over the 
next three decades. With two World Wars and the 
Depression, it was not surprising that little time or 
energy was spent on the "misfits of society". B.L.S . 
Dallard, who was the Permanent Head of the Justice 
Department from 1933 to 1949, remarked that: 
"During my period of office the cold hand 
of Treasury was evidenced in our annual 
appropriations. This was understandable 
when we recall that we had the after effects 
of a World War, two financial depressions 
and a second world war. The shortage of 
money profoundly restricted the full 
expression of zeal for reform." (14) 
5. 
During this period the groundwork was laid for a 
classification system which still partially exists today. 
13. Mayhew, op. cit., p.21 
14. J.L. Robson - "Crime and Penal Policy" - N.Z.Journal 
of Public Administration, 1971, p20 
at p.24. 
• 
6. 
"The general scheme of classification at this time was 
based on sex, age, criminal experience and propensities. 
In the first instance prisoners were placed under 
observation for a short period at a central prison and 
subsequently assigned to institutions suited to their 
need and personality, where they were considered likely 
to react more satisfactorily. The more dangerous and 
intractable prisoners were detained at Mount Eden Prison; 
the more amenable for whom there were reasonable hopes 
of reformation were transferred to the farms and camps; 
the young offenders were sent to borstal institutions; 
prisoners showing an inclination to sex perversion were 
segregated at New Plymouth .... ' and the older and 
infirm prisoners were kept at Wanganui. Wellington Prison 
was mainly a trial and remand prison, and Wi Tako a small 
prison farm to take the overflow of short sentence 
prisoners from Wellington and other nearby police gaols."(lS) 
1954 - 1960 
With the appointment in 1949 of S.T. Barnett 
as Secretary of Justice, penal policy was given a much-
needed boost. The 1951 Prison's report . stated: 
"The principal weakness in the New Zealand 
penal system arises out of the failure to 
revise the law relating to criminal punish-
ment, the failure to provide a proper 
system of classification and the failure 
to provide adequately for the trade training 
and education of prisoners." 
In 1952 the Department of Justice,in its annual 
report, declared its intention of revitalising the 
probation service. 
In 1954 two Acts were passed, the Criminal Justice 
15. Missen, op. cit., pp.17-18. 
Act 1954, and the Penal Institutions Act 1954, to give 
practical effect to modern theories of crime and punish-
ment and to provide a suitable legal framework for the 
treatment of offenders. These Acts "may well be found 
to mark a watershed in our penal history. What it did 
was to effect a break-through - the first comprehensive 
forward-looking and open minded legislation since 1910. 
It was then that the process of continuous reform and 
,ft\ , II (16) exper1;ntat1on began. 
While the legislation passed in 1954 undoubtedly 
marked the zenith of the Barnett era, the same year 
witnessed the surfacing of a spectre which was to haunt 
7. 
Barnett until the day he resigned: the paucity of proper 
and sufficient accommodation for prisoners. Overcrowding 
in penal institutions was in part a logical consequence 
of the failure by previous governments to allocate 
sufficient finance for the construction of new penal 
institutions. The problem was further aggravated by 
Barnett's unwillingness and, perhaps, inability, to 
press government for the finance necessary to build the 
sorely-needed institutions. 
in the 1959 Annual Report: 
As Barnett himself conceded 
"During the 10 years I have been in this 
Department, capital expenditure on schools, 
hospitals, housing, roading and the like have 
come first. I accept that situation because, 
after all, I have been contending only for 
better penal institutions and a better penal 
system." 
Barnett's lack of success in achieving government 
approval for expenditure on prisons can be attributed 
partially to the fact that New Zealand in the 1950's was 
preoccupied with economic questions. The problem was 
further compounded by the frequent changing of Ministers -
16. Missen, op. cit., p.23 
8. 
during his term, Barnett served three different Ministers. 
The first Minister was Clifton Webb, who made it clear 
at an early stage that he did not endorse Barnett's 
reformative programme; furthermore, some personal anti-
pathy existed between the two men. J.R. Marshall became 
Minister towards the end of 1954 and, although he was 
eager to place greater emphasis on a reformative policy, 
he did not make any major change. In 1957, with the 
election of a Labour Government, H.G.R. Mason became 
Minister of Justice. While he was deeply interested in 
penal reform he achieved little "partly because his Govern-
ment held office by a slim majority and partly because he 
seemed unable to secure whole-hearted support within 
Cabinet for his policy measures." 
(17) 
1961 - 1969 
Much as been written about this period of New Zealand 
penal policy(lB) and it is not proposed to deal with the 
many progressive reforms initiated during the decade under 
the guidance of the Minister of Justice, J.R. Hanan, and 
the Secretary of Justice, Dr. J.L. Robson. 
For the purpose of this paper, the most important 
-Ro~ n characteristic of the Hanan~era was the ernphc:Ei.s given to 
the need for public acceptance of departmental policies. 
Robson realised the necessity of securing public approval 
if some of the more innovative measures which the Depart-
rnent proposed, were to be implemented. 
stated: 
As Robson himself 
17. 
18. 
"In my ruminations on penal policy I 
kept corning back to the question of 
public attitudes. There seemed no other 
J.L. Robson - "Penal Policy in New Zealand - Australia 
and N.Z. Journal of Criminology, December, 
1971: 4, 4, at p.196. 
e.g. M.V. Stace - Penal Policy In New Zealand, 1961-1969 -
LLM Thesis Auckland University, 1971. 
J.L. Robson, "Penal Policy in the Crucible" in Law, 
Justice and Equity, Pitman & Sons, London 
1967, p.56 
J.L. Robson, supra n.l~ 
J,L. Robson, supra, n.17 
• 
way but a direct sustained attack 
over a wide front before progress 
could be made (19) ... I knew I could 
make little headway until I had dealt 
effectively with the question of public 
attitudes." (20) 
Robson realised that the reformative policies of 
the department would stand or fall depending on public 
9. 
attitudes. Furthermore, public interest had to be diverted 
as far as possible away from the less savou:ryaspects of the 
penal system, such as escapes from institutions, overcrowding, 
etc. since such interest might consolidate so as to jeopardise 
the reformative programme. 
This paper traces the development of Paremoremo 
Prison and spans the entire Hanan-Robson period. Therefore 
many of the other salient characterists of the era will 
become apparent as theyarise in context. Suffice to say 
at this stage that it is the writer's contention that this 
emphasis on public relations influenced the construction 
of Paremoremo. 
CONCLUSION: 
If there is one feature which has been prevalent 
throughout New Zealand penal his~ory, it has been the 
failure of successive governments to administer the penal 
system in a responsible and efficient manner. All too 
often the government of the day would shrug off its duty 
and refuse to authorise the expenditure necessary for the 
construction of vitally needed institutions. Mention is 
made in 'Crime and the Community', that between 1934 
and 1964, only one complete building had been erected, that 
being Waikune Prison. 
19. 
20. 
J.L. Robson - "Penal Policy in the Crucible" - in 
Law, Justice and Equity. Pitman & Sons 
London, 1967, p.56 
J.L. Robson, op.cit. n.18 at p.197 
10. 
Inevitably, events caught up with the penal 
administration, and during the 1950's and 1960's, New 
Zealand prisons were characterised by severe overcrowding, 
especially in medium and maximum security accommodation. 
SECTION 2: THE NATIONAL PRISON CENTRE A
T WAIKERIA: 
The notion of replacing Mount Eden Prison with
 a 
new maximum security institution was originally
 mooted 
11 .• 
in 1951. Faced with the prospect of inadequ
ate institutions 
and imminent overcrowding, Barnett recommended
 that a long-
term plan for the New Zealand prison system be 
drawn up. 
In the 1951 Annual Report on Prisons, Barnettt 
stated: 
"The best br6ad conception of the future 
that we can formulate is to set up 
gradually a comprehensive prison centre 
in the North Island. New Zealand has 
a relatively small prison population for 
its area, and it is impossible to do good 
classification and reach a high standard 
in training where there is only a series 
of small institutions with a certain 
"sameness" in the training potential and 
general character of the institution. 
I think we should have a group of 
institutions on one site, such institutions 
to provide for classification from full 
security to completely open treatment. Then 
we could assemble in one group the small 
number of specialised staff we will need and 
provide a scope of vocational training . 
. ... . It remains to be considered where best 
to site such a centre. As it happens we have 
an estate of sufficient size at Waikeria. 
Four or five institutions could be located 
around theperimeter at a sufficient distance 
from one another with a central administration 
block to serve all ... The present institution 
at Waikeria would serve as the nucleus of the 
full security building, which is, of course, 
the most expensive of prison buildings to 
erect. To adopt this plan would be, I believe,
 
the quickest way to get out of Mount Eden, and 
would, in the long run, give us the best 
chance of getting into the forefront of penal 
services." 
Government approval of the proposed scheme was 
forthcoming 
and while the prospect of an immediate start to
 construction 
of the Centre was remote, Barnett was imbued w
ith some degree 
of optimism. 
remarked: 
In the 1952 Annual Prisons Report, he 
"Although on present indications there 
appears to be little prospect of getting 
this centre for some considerable time, 
yet we may work toward it. Presently 
we are engaged in preparing the general 
plan. Given a variety of institutions 
in one place properly equipped, we shall 
have no excuse for not showing the way 
in penal practice." 
Tentative plans of the Centre were prepared, but, 
in actual terms, no real progress was made on the con-
struction of the proposed institutions. 
12·. 
The failure by previous governments to allocate 
sufficient finance for the erection of new institutions 
coupled with a steady increase in prison population, resulted 
in overcrowding in many institutions. 
prompted to remark that: 
In 1954, Barnett was 
"We are on the verge of an accommodation crisis." 
Then followed the inevitable query: 
"With the pressing social need for houses, 
hospitals, and schools, we may well know 
where we stand in the order of priority. 
Nevertheless, the question which will soon 
press hardly for answer is - do we maintain 
and enlarge existing decayed and archaic 
institutions or do we make a modest commence-
ment with the National Prison Centre which 
Government has approved in principle? 
Preliminary work has been done on the ground 
plan for siting institutions and incidental 
installations. It is our hope that we may 
be able to make a start on a medium security 
institution and free the present building 
for conversion into a full-time security (l) 
institution in replacement of Mount Eden." 
1. 1954 Annual Report on the Department of Justice. 
• 
13 · 
~ 
Barnett, unfortunately was guilty of indulfng in 
some wishful thinking. While he recognised the very 
real need for a new institution to replace Mount Eden, it 
is apparent that either he never requested Government for 
the finance necessary to begin construction at Waikeria, or 
else he realised the futility of such a request. Perhaps 
the latter reason was somewhere nearer the truth for in his 
1957 Report, Barnett commented: 
"I have in the past been reluctant to 
request large sums of money for capital 
development for I have been aware of the 
urgent need for the development of other 
Government . services." 
Nevertheless, continued Barnett, 
"The position has now arisen .... when 
there is no alternative to a large-scale 
prisons building programme ..... (T)here 
has been a large increase in prison 
population and urgent action is being 
taken to provide more inmate accommodation 
at Waikeria. The construction of a new 
dormitory block has been approved and 
planning is in progress. Approval is 
also being sought to enable planning to 
begin next year on a new cell block and 
a new borstal as the first step in 
developing Waikeria as a National Prison 
Centre." 
The consistent attitude of government in the 1950's 
had been to defer expenditure on major items, such as 
construction of new prisons and borstals, in favour of 
expenditure on minimum security buildings, which, obviously, 
were quicker and cheaper to erect. This attitude 
inevitably resulted in an embarrassment of riches in one 
area, and an acute poverty in others. The tone of the 
1958 Annual Report was again one of despair: 
"Once again I have to report a considerable 
increase in the number of men and youths in 
our prisons and borstals ••. The position has 
now been reached in which practically every 
possible form of improvisation has 
already been made and there is still 
insufficient room in the institutions 
for the ever-increasing number of inmates. 
We have, however, now reached a stage in 
which the high proportion of minimum 
security accommodation has become an 
embarrassment. Our greatest need is for 
150 maximum security beds because there 
appears to be a higher proportion of 
prisoners being received whose record 
of attitude is such that they should not 
be detained in other than maximum security 
conditions. Unfortunately however the 
quickest buildings to erect are of a 
minimum security type. This lack of 
14 .· 
maximum security accommodation is particularly 
serious in our borstal institutions. 
It has been necessary, because of the 
increase in the number of inmates, to 
concentrate on new prison buildings, in 
particular, the development of Waikeria." 
Barnett's frustration at banging his head against a 
brickwall of governmental indifference to the plight of 
the prison system, turned to resentment, and the 1959 
Annual Report had much to say: 
II .. (E)vents have caught up with us 
I am now obliged to say that, even without 
attempting to modernise our penal system, a 
great deal of money must be spent in 
quickly planning and building unless there is 
to be a complete breakdown in the prisons, 
borstal and probation services. That we 
must build - and do so quickly - I think is 
undeniable The time has passed when we 
could expect to solve our accommodation 
problem simply by placing a few more huts 
in the prison camps, or by converting a 
stores room into a dormitory. It has ceased 
to be a matter merely of finding the space 
for a few more beds (T)he decision to 
enter int~ a major building programme cannot 
be deferred, nor can construction be impeded if 
offenders are still to be sent to penal 
institutions." 
The Report then went on to discuss an overall plan 
for prison construction which would cater for the expected 
increase in prison population until 1975. The plan 
outlined the new or enlarged institutions needed and 
also set out the location and type of institutions 
considered necessary. The plan administered the 
kiss of death to the proposed National Prison Centre 
at Waikeria. 
"Our plans for the development of the 
National Penal Centre have been recorded 
previously (W)e have abandoned the 
conception of a National Prison Centre 
at Waikeria. When that idea was submitted 
first we were calculating on the incidence 
of crime remaining steady. It is now 
obvious that, by the time the institutions 
are built, there will be only room for 
young adult prisoners and borstal trainees •.. " 
According to the plan, Waikeria was to become a 
National Centre for Young Prisoners, and the whole estate 
was to be given over to corrective and borstal trainees. 
15. 
The proposal to ~urn the existing Waikeria institution 
into a maximum security institution was shelved; instead 
it was suggested that Mount Eden be used solely as a 
maximum security prison, and a new prison he built 
in the grounds of Mount Eden to cater for remands and 
short-sentence prisoners. 
CONCLUSION: 
While the concept of a national prison centre, catering 
for all types of offenders is open to debate, there is no 
doubt that had Barnett's ideas been implemented, New Zealand 
would have been 'blessed' with a maximum security institution 
by 1958, instead of 1968. The construction of a national 
prison centre, would have undoubtedly staved off much of the 
overcrowding and inmate unrest which were the bane of New 
Zealand prisons, and, especially, Mount Eden, in the 1960's. 
SECTION (3) THE INADEQUACY OF MOUNT EDEN PRISON 1949-1964 
Sir - Remember the song of about 35 years ago? 
In the Big Rock Candy Mountains, 
The gaols are made of tin, 
And you can walk right out again, 
Once they've put you in. 
- I am, etc., 
Mount Eden. 
Letter to the editor which appeared 
in the Evening Post in about 1964 
"Mount Eden's a hell of a place. I'd sooner end 
up in the cemetery than back there." 
(a) The 1950's 
- Prison escaper Leonard Evans, 
reported in the Evening Post 
February 5, 1965. 
Mount Eden Prison was initially erected as a stockade 
in the 1870's. By 1917 it had become New Zealand's chief 
penal prison, and many hardened offenders served their 
sentences there. Various governments had authorised 
improvements to the Prison from time to time, but by 1949 
there was a realisation that Mount Eden was an archaic and 
antiquated institution, which was in urgent need of 
replacement. The 1950 Annual Report on Prisons remarked 
that Mount Eden 
" 
ago. 
was first erected some seventy years 
It is now in a closely-built 
residential area. It is now quite 
unsuitable and inadequate and there 
are insufficient exercise yards or 
suitable labour facilities for modern 
penological treatment. Apart from 
trial and remand prisoners and local 
short termers, the more dangerous 
and intractable prisoners in respect 
of whom security considerations are 
paramount are kept there. The re-
placement of such an institution is 
a major problem but it is hoped that 
a solution may be found within a 
reasonable time." 
17. 
In a similar vein, the 1951 Annual Report commented: 
"A most significant announcement, and 
certainly most gladdening to aprison 
administrator, is the decision of 
the Minister, the Hon. T. Clifton Webb 
(and Government), that Mount Eden Prison 
must go. We can never make radical 
changes to bring us in line with modern 
penal practice as long as we are tied 
to Mount Eden as our main institution. 
In the same Report, the Secretary of Justice, S.T. 
Barnett, outlined a plan to erect a national prison centre 
at Waikeria. It was proposed that such a centre would 
cater for all types of offenders, and that the existing 
institution at Waikeria would house those inmates who 
warranted maximum security conditions. However, progress 
at the Waikeria site never extended beyond drawing up 
plans for siting institutions and incidental installations. 
Overcrowding 
Meanwhile, the prison population rose steadily and 
it was not long before many of the institutions became 
overcrowded. The lack of sufficient maximum security 
accommodation resulted in Mount Eden Prison holding many 
more prisoners than it was effectively capable of doing. 
In 1957 the daily average muster at Mount Eden was 348.83 
male inmates. By 1958 this figure had risen to 393 
with a peak, at one time, of 427 inmates being held 
in the prison. These figures are significant when 
it is realised that the designed maximum capacity of 
Mount Eden was less than 300. 
Escapes 
18. 
While overcrowding constituted a serious problem, 
it was e~apes from Mount Eden which aroused much publicity. 
As Barnett himself noted: 
"Escapes are the bane of the penal 
administration because, in this 
country at any rate, they attract 
so much public attention." (1) 
Indeed, during the decade, public consternation was 
aroused not only at the frequency of escapes (from 1949-
1959 a total of 20 inmates had escapeJ~ but also by the 
type of offender who escaped. Escapes from a so-called 
'maximum security' institution are bad enough; but 
when the escaper is a convicted murderer, then all hell 
breaks loose. 
There were some very notable escapers from Mount Eden 
during the 1950's, and their escapes attracted much 
public attention. 
1. 1959 Annual Report on the Department of Justice. 
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Year 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
No of 
escapes 5 
from Mt. 
Eden 
1 1 4 2 2 2 3 
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The escape of ~eo Sylvester Hannan, a convicted 
murderer, on February 14, 1955, prompted Truth to remark 
that the escape 
" has possibly done Auckland a service 
by drawing attention to the vulnerability 
of New Zealand's reputedly strongest 
security prison ... Mount Eden is not 
only an out-of-date prison by any modern 
standards. It is also a constant risk, 
situated as it is in the centre of New 
Zealand's largest city and adjacent to 
one of its largest secondary schools. 
None of which removes the obligation of 
the authorities to ensure that all possible 
precautions are employed to prevent 
escapes." (3) 
There was a further public uproar in 1955 when Edward 
Horton escaped on December 6. Horton had been sentenced 
in 1948 to life imprisonment for murder. The Chief 
Justice, Sir Humphrey O'Leary, adtlressed these words to 
( 4) 
Horton at the time of sentence: 
"Our Eng 1 i sh language s car:e ly has words 
powerful enough to express the heinous 
nature of your crime. I doubt whether 
diabolical or fiendish are adequate to 
describe the way you attacked, maimed 
and outraged and murdered this unfortunate 
little woman out for her Sunday morning 
walk .... It would appear you are a menace 
to society and dangerous to be at large." 
"Horton was notorious enough but the circumstances 
in which he escaped made the situation much worse. He 
was one of a party who had been taken from the prison to a 
church hall for a game of bowls. The view was widespread 
that he should not have been allowed out for such a purpose 
so early in his sentence (N)ewspaper editorials 
throughout the country heaped abuse and criticism upon 
the administration. There were rumours that the Minister 
3. New Zealand Truth, February 23, 1955. 
4. For a fuller version of The Chief Justice's address 
see J.L. Robson - "Crime and Penal Policy". N.Z. Jo. 
of Pub. Admin. 1971, p.20 at pp 27-28. 
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would be obliged to resign II 
( 5) 
During 1956 there were two escapes from Mount Eden, 
both escapers were not regarded as dangerous to the public, 
and, therefore, the publicity given to the escapes was 
fairly minor. 
However, in 1958 prison authorities discovered a 
systematic practice of prisoners escaping from Mount Eden, 
committing crimes and returning to their cells before 
daybreak. The press, as one would expect, were incensed 
at this discovery and were highly critical of both the 
prison administration and the prison itself. 
Zealand Herald commented: 
The New 
"Such happenings might be held possible 
at one of the minor prison camps or 
farms, where prisoners abuse a trust 
system and take illegal leave. But not, 
surely, at Mount Eden. 
For Mount Eden is the one New Zealand 
prison where full security is enforced. 
It houses some of the worst criminals 
in the country Tighter security 
prec~tions can be introduced at Mount 
Eden, but the long-term need of a new 
prisons set-up is quickly becoming a 
short-term urgency." (6) 
Forced into a corner, the Minister of Justice, H.G.R. 
Mason, conceded that Mount Eden was "outdated and in the 
worst possible place for a high-security gaol. The latest 
escapade emphasised the need for increased staff and further 
( 7) 
buildings." The Minister hoped, however, that the 
public would understand that the prison service was performing 
a most creditable task under circumstances that were not easy. 
Mount Eden was accommodating about 150 more prisoners than 
it was built for. Mr. Mason stated that the Government 
5. 
6. 
7. 
J.L. Robson, ibid, p.28 
N.Z. Herald, June 14, 1958 
Christchurch Press, June 16, 1958 
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was investigating ways and means of speeding up the 
development of the National Prison Centre at Waikeria. 
Stronger security measures were taken at Mount Eden, 
and the Secretary of Justice, S.T. Barnett, wrote to the 
Superintendent of Mount Eden that: 
"Although I do not suggest that the 
escapes resulted directly from the 
allocations to cells I feel that 
there is a need for the exercise of 
greater prudence in allocation 
In particular you must ensure that 
those inmates whose escape would 
cause undue public concern are in 
the most secure accommodation." 
(b) The 1960' s: 
While the problems encountered at Mount Eden during 
the 1950's were sufficient to give a prison administrator 
a severe headache, events in the early 1960's were enough to 
induce a nervous breakdown. 
Overcrowding continued to be a severe problem, and 
Mount Eden regularly held over 400 inmates. (
9 ) dver-
crowding led to tensions within the institutions and, 
inevitably, incidents occurred. In the 1962 Annual Report 
8. Muster at Mount Eden 1960 - 1965: 
Year Average Number Average Number Greatest Number 
of Male Inmates of Female of Inmates at 
Inmates An:i One Time 
1960 413.34 10.35 446 
1961 388 11 424 
1962 394 10 441 
1963 371 10 407 
1964 358 10 408 
1965 345 11. 7 360 
Dr. Robson alluded to this problem. 
"Overcrowding is still the most serious 
problem in male institutions. The 
main reception institutions have been 
forced to continue placing 2 or 
more men in a cell, and it has been 
impossible to adequately segregate the 
various categories of offenders. 
Facilities for training, education and 
recretation have been taxed to the limit. 
The frustrations and annoyances that 
result from overcrowded conditions 
cause · dangerous tensions manifested in 
outbreaks of violence or disorder. 
Several incidents that have occurred at 
Auckland Prison are the result of the 
gross overcrowding in that prison." 
2 2. 
As in the 1950's, it was escapes from Mount Eden which 
attracted much publicity. 
On April 11, 1960, Angelo La Mattina, a convicted 
murderer, 'escaped' from his cell and hid in the roof of 
Mount Eden for eight days until he was recaptured. On 
February 3, 1961, Trevor Edward Nash, a convicted pay-roll 
thief escaped and was at liberty for nearly six months 
until recaptured. 
These escapes were publicised in the press, and the 
question always asked was. "How can inmates, dangerous 
to the public, escape from a maximum security prison such as 
Mount Eden?" 
Overcrowding, escapes, and the publicity attributed to 
the deficiences of Mount Eden, culminated in a drop in 
the morale of prison officers at the prison. 
On April 21, 1961 the Central Committee of the Prisons' 
Group (P,S.A.) wrote to the Secretary of Justice, claiming 
that the Committee had received expressions of concern from 
the members at Auckland Prison at recent references by the 
press to Mount Eden as being a 'full security' prison. The 
23. 
letter outlined several submissions put forward by the 
prison officers: 
(1) The vulnerability of a prison housing 400 
inmates situated within New Zealand's largest 
city. 
(2) The lack of facilities for adequate segregation 
of different classes Gf prisoners, and the 
impossibility of classification of inmates occupying 
the double and association cells. 
(3) The impossibility of adequate supervision with 
the open system of visiting in a supposed 
maximum security prison. 
The Secretary of Justice replied: 
"Needless to say, the Department is fully 
aware of the limitations of Auckland 
Prison as a maximum security institution. 
However, it is undoubtedly our most 
secure institution and irrespective of 
what we call it, it will continue to be 
in the public mind, New Zealand's 
maximum security institution. I hope 
the time will not be too distant when 
we will have a maximum security prison 
of the standard of the most modern 
institution overseas .... In the meantime 
I see little point in trying to alter 
the general impression that this is a 
maximum security institution." 
Public attention was again focused on Mount Eden, 
following the escape on April 2, 1962 of La Mattina and 
Edward Tell. 
"How 
9 • . 
The Dominion, in an editorial, 
(9) secure are the Prisons?" 
posed the question 
"The escape of Angelo La Mattina from 
Mount Eden prison will naturally have 
The Dominion, 3 April, 1962 
given rise to a great deal of uneasiness, 
not to say alarm, among the public. La 
Mattina is a convicted murderer. His passion 
to escape his life sentence could involve 
him in desperate and dangerous acts. The 
public, therefore while demanding that every 
resource be turned to his recapture, will 
also wish to know how it can come about, as 
indeed it has before, that a prisoner 
of La Mattina's reputation can successfully 
bid for freedom. The short answer is that 
Mount Eden is not a full maximum security 
prison on modern standards, although it 
is the nearest approach we have to one. In 
fact, the most urgent of New Zealand prison 
needs in terms of new establishments is a 
male maximum security centre." 
24. 
In an endeavour to prevent the unwelcome publicity 
caused by escapes, Dr. Robson wrote to the Superintendent 
of Mount Eden. 
"The Mattina-Tell escape and other recent 
incidents have emphasised the problems you 
are faced with in the management of Mount 
Eden. I wish I could paint a better picture 
for the future but at present I can see 
little hope of any significant drop in 
numbers or of any improvement in the character 
of the inmate your institution is holding 
While any escape from Mount Eden will 
always attract some public interest, there 
is a considerable group of inmates whose 
escape would cause, not only interest, but 
also concern and even alarm. Such a group 
might include lifers and others convicted 
of crimes of violence as well as known 
escapers and the more serious offenders 
against property. You will tell me that 
many of these are no longer security risks 
but as long as they remain in Mount Eden, 
they must be assumed to require maximum 
custody." 
La Mattina again escaped on September 19, 1962, but was 
recaptured the same day. In a press statement the next day, 
Mr. Hanan pleaded for public understanding of the difficulties 
faced by the prison administration at Mount Eden: 
"In any institution holding maximum security 
prisoners there will always be some who 
constantly seek to outwit the staff and 
make good their escape In an 
inadequate institution such as Mount 
Eden, these men should be watched 
continuously as individuals but the 
present overcrowding coupled with 
shortage of staff makes continuous 
supervision extremely difficult ... 
At the present time the institution 
is 14 officers short of authorised 
establishment .... This shortage in 
staffing in an institution which is 
both overcrowded and inadequate makes 
the task of the staff a particularly 
trying one and the public should know 
of these difficulties." 
In the 1963 Annual Report of the Department of 
Justice, reference was made to the problem of escapes 
from Mount Eden: 
tt ..... because of the inadequacy for its 
purpose of our only maximum security 
prison, some of the escapes in 1962 
were of a spectacular nature and 
attracted much publicity. It is clear 
that special accommodation must be 
provided for a small group of inmates 
whose thoughts and plans are constantly 
directed towards escape." 
25. 
The Report then went on to propose that women 
prisoners be removed from Mount Eden, and that a specially 
secure unit for security risks and recalcitrants be 
constructed. 
1963 got off to an extremely bad start, when on January 
29, four inmates (including the celebrated George Wilder) 
escaped from Mount Eden. All the inmates involved had previous 
escape records, and two had absconded from Tongariro Prison 
Farm only a month previously. 
The reaction of the press was predictable: 
"The Auckland Prison - ill-sited, grossly 
over9r.owd~d and difficult to manage - is 
no place for such men. Yet there is nowhere 
.. 
else to send them. Whatever 
efforts are made to intensify 
security at Mount Eden, escapes 
will continue. The very nature 
of the breakaway yesterday shows 
the inherent weaknesses of an 
archaic institution. It should 
make the Government determined to 
apply one practicable remedy - a 
new prison." (10) 
"No-one can blame the Mount Eden 
Authorities forthe escapes. Mount 
Eden is not a full-security prison 
and bad-overcrowding increases the 
difficulties of supervision. Obviously 
escapes will continue so long as no 
better place than Mount Eden is avail-
able to house our most desperate 
criminals" (11) 
"It is not right that, because of a 
lack of a suitable institution, the 
public should be periodically 
subjected to the anxiety caused by 
the knowledge that desperate criminals 
are on the run." ( 12) 
26. 
On March 14, 1963, Mr. Hanan released a press statement 
on strengthening the security of Mount Eden. 
stated that: 
The Minister 
" .. he had to emphasise once again that 
Mount Eden could not now be regarded as 
a maximum security institution. There 
were fundamental weaknesses in its 
design which would be most difficult 
to correct but his Department had 
embarked on a number of measures to 
strengthen its security." 
The Minister had decided, therefore, that the segregation 
of inmates who were intractable could not wait the completion 
of the new maximum security institution. He had considered 
several possibilities and was convinced that the best answer 
lay in the removal of the woman's section from Mount Eden. 
This would enable the area vacated to be set aside for the 
construction of a small secure unit to contain this type 
10. 
11. 
12. 
N.Z. Herald, January 30, 1963 
The Dominion, January 30, 1963 
The Timaru Herald, February 1, 1963 
27. 
of inmate. 
The Auckland Star was quick to applaud the Minister's 
statement: 
"The so-called maximum security jail 
in Auckland is no longer officially 
so-called. In acknowledging this, 
the Minister of Justice, Mr. Hanan 
has realistically got into step with 
public opinion. His recognition that 
something must be done right away to 
tighten security in this leaky old 
prison is also realistic .... However, 
the decision to build the secure unit 
cannot be regarded as anything but a 
stop-gap." (13) 
In 1964 construction began on the secure unit at 
Mount Eden. It was proposed that the unit hold up +o 
fourteen of the worst offenders at Mount Eden. 
The unit was completed in February, 1965. 
Conclusion: 
The inadequacy, insecurity and sheer old age of Mount 
Eden in the 19SO's prompted the decision to construct a 
new maximum security institution. By the end of the 1950's 
the Government had finally realised that the prison was 
out-dated and antiquated, and that it fell far short of 
the standards required of a maximum security institution. 
Events in the early 1960's reinforced the decision 
taken by the Government in August 1962, to build a new 
maximum security institution in place of M0unt Eden. However, 
it was not until the riots at Mount Eden in July, 1965 that 
urgency was accorded to the project. 
13. Auckland Star, March 15, 1963 
SECTION ( 4) THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAREMOREMO PRISON 
( i) The Decision to Build a New Maximum Security 
Institution. 
28. 
It will be recalled that the 1959 Annual Report of 
the Department of Justice contained a plan outlin&ingthe 
new and enlarged institutions needed for the effective 
operation of the New Zealand penal system. The Report 
stated that Mount Eden Prison was overcrowded and that it 
catered for remands and short-sentence prisoners as well 
as for long-term prisoners and others requiring maximum 
security conditions. It was therefore proposed 
"to build another institution in the 
grounds of Mount Eden Prison to cater for 
those men held on remand awaiting 
transfer, or serving short sentences. 
These buildings will enable Mount Eden to 
be used solely for the hard core of 
prisoners who have to be held in conditions 
of maximum security." 
t,\;"~' 
In June, 1960, a memorandum from the See¥et 'Y of 
Justice was circulated to all members of the Cabinet Works 
committee, seeking the approval,in principle, of the 
committee to the erection of a Remand and Short Sentence 
Prison in Auckland. The memorandum also noted that: 
"An alternative proposal has been con-
sidered but rejected on the grounds of 
economy. The proposal is to build 
a new maximum security institution 
on another site away from Auckland city 
and to use the present Mount Eden Prison 
as a Remand centre. Such an institution 
would cost an estimated £910,000 and this 
expenditure is not recommended because of 
our extensive requirements and the fact 
that our requirements can be satisfied 
with the erection of a smaller institution." 
The memo reflected the logical opinion held by many 
29. 
persons in the Justice Department, that the cheaper the 
cost of the institution, the more likely it is to be 
approved by Government. 
Evidently, some members of the Cabinet Works 
committee harboured serious doubts as to the desir-
ability of prolorgi.ng the existence of Mount Eden as a 
maximum security institution. The committee deferred 
consideration of the matter and invited the Minister 
of Justice to submit a report outlining the reasons 
why maximum security prisoners could not be accommodated 
on the site of the planned maximum security prison at 
Waikeria. 
or. Robson was appointed Secretary of Justice in 
July, 1960, and he held firm views on the concept of a 
national prison centre. At a Penal Group Meeting late 
in July, or. Robson stated that he considered a Prison 
Centre, with an expected population of 983 inmates, to 
be an "administrative horror". It was resolved that 
the Centre would cater for 750 inmates at the most. 
or. Robson's doubts over the desirability of the 
national prison centre received Ministerial approval in 
November, 1960 when the Minister of Justice, Mr. Mason, 
replied to the cabinet Works committee as follows: 
"The objections to accommodating maximum 
security prisoners at Waikeria are summarised 
as follows: 
(a) It would be quite wrong to have 
borstal and maximum security 
inmates on the one property. 
Although any maximum security 
institution established there 
would be enclosed by a wall and 
inmates would seldom be outside 
the wall, I am certain that the 
mere presence there of the worst 
of our adult criminal population 
would have a most unsettling effect 
on the younger age group. 
(b) It is important to our borstal 
training to have a nearby community 
which will accept the institution 
and play its part in its recreational, 
cultural and spiritual programme 
30. 
I feel sure that the presence of a 
maximum security institution in the 
area would alienate our good relations. 
(c) I would much prefer that any new 
maximum security institution be 
established in the Auckland area near 
a large centre of population. 
When I put forward the proposal for the Remand 
Prison, I did so because I felt that it was the 
most economical way of overcoming our problem 
in Auckland, It would cost an estimated 
£250,000 against about£1,000,000 for a new 
maximum security institution plus the cost 
of converting the existing Mount Eden Prison 
into a Remand Prison." 
In November/December, 1960 upon Dr Robson's 
return from an extensive trip overseas, the building pro-
gramme for prisons was completely reviewed and an assess-
ment made of requirements for the next 15 years. This 
assessment included the need for a new male maximum 
security institution, the completion of which would enable 
Mount Eden to be converted into a institution for trial, 
remand and short-sentence inmates. 
An editorial in the New Zealand Herald on 8 April, 1961 
called for morevigorous progress with the long deferred 
building programme. This 
"would not only improve security but 
also enable more offenders to be 
restored to a useful and law-abiding 
place in society." 
On May 10, 1961, a revised building programme based on 
overseas trends was submitted to the cabinet Works committee. 
The programme limited Waikeria to borstal accommodation only 
and included provision for a new maximum security institution 
at Auckland. 
X 
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However, it was nearly nine months after this 
programme had been submitted to Cabinet, that the Justice 
Department eventually sought Government approval for the 
construction of a new maximum security institution. In 
a memorandum to the Cabinet Works committee(l) the Minister 
of Justice, Mr. Hanan, stated that: 
"The Auckland Prison has a maximum 
designed capacity of 275 to 300 inmates 
but at times during the past three years 
it has been holding up to 450 inmates. 
There is serious overcrowding and 
conditions are unsatisfactory. The 
institution holds remands including young 
offenders, short sentence and long term 
inmates and it is difficult to segregate 
these groups. In 1960 my predecessor 
proposed, on the grounds of economy, that 
the remand centre be built .... The 
building of a Remand Prison on the present 
site in Auckland would temporarily 
relieve the problem but there is no doubt 
that pressure would be brought to bear 
to remove the maximum security institution 
particularly with two institutions in 
Auckland city ... Although a new maximum 
security institution will cost nearly 
£1,000,000 it would be false economy 
to meet the problem by building a new 
remand institution and using the present 
institution for maximum security ..• The 
problem should be faced now and a 
decision made to rebuild in the 
Auckland area." 
The Minister recommended that the Cabinet Works 
committee: 
" (a) Approve in principle the 
construction of a new maximum 
security institution of 200 
beds in the Auckland area 
and 
(c) Authorise , negotiations for the 
acquisition of a site for the 
maximum security institution." 
1. 26 February, 1962 
> 
I 
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At their meeting on March 14, 1962, the cabinet 
Works committee accepted the recommendations, and the 
Justice Department commenced a search for a suitable 
site for the proposed institution. 
(ii) Site: 
The requirements of the Justice Department were that 
the site be within a general radius of 30 miles of Auckland 
(with a definite preference for land south of Auckland) and 
that the land should be about 80 acres in area. 
Prior to 1962, the Department had investigated 
numerous • sites, but by May 1962, interest had focused 
on two properties - one was 12 miles north of Auckland at 
Paremoremo, near Albany, and the other was south near 
Manurewa. 
At a meeting on May 28, 1962, the Buildings committee 
decided in favour of the Albany property, but considered 
that the possibility of acquiring other sites in the area 
should be investigated further. 
on July 4, 1962 a memorandum was circulated to members 
of the cabinet Works committee by the Minister of Justice, 
requesting approval to purchase the site at Paremoremo. In 
addition, the Minister requested that the committee approve 
the expenditure of up to £52,000 to purchase the site. 
on July 18, 1962 the cabinet Works committee approved 
the expenditure requested for the acquisition of the site. 
The New Zealand Herald breathed an editorial sigh of 
relief at the approval to purchase a site for the new 
. . t . . . ( 2) maximum securi y institution. 
"The choice of a site on the upper 
2. August 8, 1962 
• 
Waitemata for the new maximum security 
prison promises an end to 20 years 
of political procrastination. The 
replacement of the gaol at Mount Eden -
in its present form a 'socially 
dismaying'anachronism - will pave the 
way for wider reforms and should help 
materially in overcoming the frustrations 
of a system which crams nearly 2000 
prisoners into institutions designed 
to accommodate 1400." 
The property at Paremoremo was purchased on 
September 8, 1962. 
(iii) Design 
33. 
With the purchase of a site, preliminary planning 
commenced on the design of the new institution. Initially 
there was a conflict of opinion as to what type of 
institution should be constructed. 
Dr Robson had firm views on the proposed new prison. 
He preferred the design of the Swedish institution at 
Norrtalje which comprised 
as to 
"separate villa type living units 
with a central administration block 
and separate workshops and other 
service buildings. None of the living 
units would be more than single storey, 
no buildings should form part of an 
outside wall, and a fence rather than 
a wall should be provided to give 
security." (3) 
A contrary opinion was expressed by some who had doubts 
"building the maximum security institution 
without having adequate facilities for 
keeping inmates in conditions of security. 
The provision of a wire fence would not, 
in their view, give anything like full 
security. It was thought too that 
3. Buildings committee Meeting, August 13, 1962 
Superintendents with long 
experience of our criminals would 
be unwilling to accept an 
institution along the lines 
suggested." (4) 
3 4 
In November, 1962 Mr. Hanan wrote to the Minister 
of Works stating that: 
II the h choice lies between a fortress type with high walls as exemplified in several of the prisons recently or about to be erected in U.S.A. and a one storied pavilion type of institution as at Norrtalje, Sweden, which is 
surrounded by a high wire fence and relies on electronic equipment and 
other modern devices. At the moment I lean in favour of the Swedish type providing that it is in fact secure up to a standard one would expect of a maximum security institution for this country." 
Meanwhile, or. Robson had written to the Director-General 
of the Swedish Prisons Board, and queried whether, 'If you 
were erecting a new maximum security prison today would 
you follow in every major way the design youhad at Norrt~lje?" 
The Director-General replied: 
. My answer is definitely. no. Norrtalje is not a maximum security institution we have just started to build an 
institution at Kumla which could be labelled 'maximum security'. In my 
opinion the Kumla central institution is as good as any full security .. institution could be these days. 
Plans of the Kumla institution were subsequently sent 
to the Justice Department. 
With the escape of four prisoners from Mount Eden 
in January, 1963, the newspapers called for urgency to 
be accorded to the building of the new prison at Paremorerno: 
"Four determined prisoners who escaped 
4. Ibid. 
from the Auckland Prison have once 
again demonstrated the urgency of 
proposals for the building of a new 
full security gaol. on present plans 
such an institution may be completed 
at Paremoremo in 1968 - or later. 
That date is too far away .... Granted 
appropriate priority, the Paremoremo 
buildings could be completed and Mount 
Eden virtually evacuated in 1964 or 
early 1965. To prod'a.stinate on such 
an issue is to trifle with public 
security." (5) 
35. 
The Minister of Justice replied in a press statement 
that he had been in touch with the Minister of Works about 
the planning of the new institution and he was trying to 
arrange for an architect from the Ministry of Works to go 
overseas soon to study designs of the latestmaxirnum 
security prisons in other countries. 
In a further press relase a month later, Mr. Hanan 
stated that he was doing his very utmost to hasten the 
building of the new maximum security prison at Paremoremo. 
cabinet had already agreed to send an architect overseas 
to study the most up to date security installations. This 
architect would look not only at the design of institutions 
but also at modern construction techniques for this type of 
building to ensure that the quickest possible methods of 
construction were used. 
Early in 1963, Mr. J.R.P. Blake-Kelly, the Assistant 
Government Architect, went overseas to study maximum 
security prisons in the united States, Sweden and England. 
Prior to his departure or. Robson wrote to him that: 
"I am not enamoured of the fortress 
approach and prefer the conceptual 
approach shown by Sweden in such 
institutions as Kumla. However, the 
design that we eventually adopt must 
produce maximum security." (my emphasis) 
5. New Zealand Herald, 30 January, 1963 
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Mr. Blake-Kelly returned in mid-1963, and the 
design of the new insitution was decided upon. unfortunately 
the writer was unable to obtain a copy of Mr. Blake-Kelly's 
report. While it is therefore impossible to state categorically 
that this report provided the blueprint for the present 
institution, it is the writer's contention that the 
conceptual design and chief characteristics of the prison 
as it exists today, had their genesis in Mr. Blake-Kelly's 
report. 
one can only speculate over the role played by 
various penal administrators in the design of the prison. 
For example, how much influence did Mr. E. Buckley (the 
S'Llferintendent of Mount Eden at the time) exercise over the 
design of the institution? Some people have labelled 
Paremoremo as "Buckley's Prison", and it is well known that 
he was constantly approached by Justice Department officers 
for his opinion on many issues concerning the construction 
of the prison. 
In a similar vein, one can also query the position of 
or. Robson. The ultimate design of the prison was a far 
cry from what he evisaged initially as an ideal maximum 
security institution - the idea of utilising a wire fence 
to provide perimeter security gave way to high concrete 
walls, villa type living units became cell blocks, and 
so on. Was or Robson perhaps persuaged by Mr. Blake-Kelly 
and others within the Justice Department, that the 
conceptual design which he favoured could not produce 
maximum security. and that there existed a very real 
possibility of escapes from such an institution? It must 
be remembered that the officers in the Department were 
greatly concerned at the time over the numerous escapes 
from Mount Eden prison. This concern undoubtedly affected 
their attitude to the design of the new institution; they 
were unlikely to sanction the construction of a maximum 
security institution which could not guarantee the 
virtual impossibility of escapes. 
only or. Robson knows the reason for his change 
of mind, unfortunately, however, he would not 
comment 
on the subject when approached by the writer. 
In August/September, 1963 the plans of the new 
institution were sent to the Superintendents of all 
penal institutions in New Zealand for their comments. The 
design of the proposed institution met with general 
approval. 
(iv) Size: 
In May, 1961 a revised building programme was 
submitted by the Justice Department to the cabinet 
Works committee. 
This programme included provision for a new male 
maximum security institution in the Auckland area. 
The capacity of this insitution was assessed at 200 
inmates. The decision to settle on 200 was made on 
November 1, 1961. However, "there seems to be no basis 
for the 200 at that time, 11 (
6 ) other than a rough'estimate 
of maximum security inmates currently being held in 
institutions in New Zealand. 
( 7) 
The proposed size of the new institution was some-
what surprising in view of the comments made by Dr. 
w:-, 
Robson in the 1961 Annaul Report that: 
II (a) 
( b) 
We should avoid large institutions 
as far as possible. Small 
institutions offer the best hope of 
success in the reformative field, 
and they are easier to control. 
We have too high a percentage of 
our inmates in maximum security. 
A substantial proportion of the 
Mount Eden inmates should be placed 
in our medium security institutions. 
6. Minutes from Senior Executive officer (Penal) to the 
Secretary of Justice, February 1, 1972. 
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7. It will be recalled that the 1958 Annual Report made mention 
of the need for 150 maximum security beds. Perhaps the 
figure of 200 was based on this figure plus the expected 
increase in the future of the number of inmates requiring 
maximum secur f t y. , b 
38. 
I consider that the ideal number in an institution 
is 100-150 and ... our future programme should 
adjusted to keep within this limit." 
In February 1962, the cabinet ·works committee accepted 
the recommendation of the Minister of Justice that approval 
be given to the construction of a new maximum security 
institution of 200 beds. 
on March 18, 1963, Dr. Robson wrote to the Assistant 
Government Architect, Mr. Blake-Kelly, giving some directions 
on the question of the size of the proposed institution. 
Dr. Robson suggested that the prison have a capacity 
of 200 inmates, with a small unit of 20 for top maximum 
security. 
Mr. Blake-Kelly returned in June, 1963 and in his 
report, recommended that the new institution include a 
reception and classification centre of 50 beds. He 
therefore proposed that the institution be increased from 
200 to 250 bed capacity. 
on July 31, 1963 the cabinet Works committee approved 
in principle this increase in the size of the new prison. 
In 1963 information was obtained from all institutions 
on the security category of inmates then in custody. One 
survey found that of the 1348 inmates then in custody, 210 
required full maximum security. 
( 8) 
On June 27, 1966 and again on December 15, 1967 
the security groupings of inmates were categorised. These 
8. It appears that another survey was conducted earlier in 
1963 which revealed that between 70 and 80 inmates required 
full maximum security. unfortunately, the papers relating to 
this survey could not be located. Furthermore, there is no 
record as to the criteria employed for this breakdown of 
security groups. It is also important to note that the results 
of the later survey were submitted to the Cabinet Works 
committee as partial justification for the increase in the size 
of the institution, recommended by the Assistant Government 
Architect. one can therefore deduce, in view of the results 
of later surveys, that the figure may have been, perhaps 
somewhat inflated. 
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surveys showed that there were 75 and 197 inmates respect-
ively who should be held in an institution like Paremoremo. 
The following is a summary of the figures: 
Institution 27.6.66 figure 15.12.67 figure 
Mount Eden 13 95 
Waikeria 48 68 
New Plymouth 4 6 
Napier nil nil 
Wellington 10 17 
Christchurch nil 10 
75 197 
-- ---
There is a considerable discrepancy in these figures 
taken out after only an eighteen month period. The increase 
in the number held at Mount Eden can be partially explained 
by the transfer of many prisoners back to Mount Eden, after 
the damage incurred during the riot in 1965 had been repaired. 
In addition, it appears that at that time "there was con-
sidered to be a general hardening of the category of inmates 
and this is borne out by the figures for each of the more 
. t. t t. ., 9 ) secure ins i u ions. 
Perhaps the substantial difference between the two figures 
is more easily explained when it is borne in mind that these 
figures were subjective estimates made by prison super-
intendents and staff and therefore liable to considerable 
fluctuations. 
One can conclude that the statistical information on 
which the Department based its decision to construct an 
institution for 200 (and, later, 250) inmates was somewhat 
sketchy and open to severe criticism. The four surveys 
conducted after the initial decision was made to settle 
on a capacity of 200 inmates provided little concrete 
justification for that figure. The wide divergence in the 
results of the surveys is hardly surprising when it is 
9. Minute from the Senior Executive Officer (Penal) to the 
Secretary of Justice, February 2, 1972. 
< 
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considered that no specific criteria were used for 
classifying prisoners. 
It is interesting to note that during this period, or. 
Robson must have changed his views on the desirable size 
of penal institutions, or, at least, maximum security 
institutions. In March, 1961 he asserted that the ideal 
number of inmates in an institution was 100-150; yet in 
November, 1961 the decision was made that Paremoremo 
would hold up to 200 inmates. Furthermore, upon the 
Assistant Government Architect's return from overseas, 
the capacity of theprison was increased to 250 beds. 
Had or. Robson violently disagreed with the proposed 
size of the institution, there is little doubt that he 
could have vetoed the plans, or, at least, altered the 
designed capacity to a more modest figure. one is left 
to draw the obvious conclusion that or. Robson consented 
to the inmate capacity of Paremoremo. Whether his consent 
was obtained by pressure exerted on him by some of his 
departmental colleagues is a question to which only he can 
( 10) provide an answer. 
(v) The Riot at Mount Eden 1965: 
In August 1963, the cabinet Works committee gave 
approval to the preparation of working drawings for the 
new institition at Paremoremo. 
In Parliament later that year, Mr. Hanan referred to 
the new prison: 
"No target has been fixed for completion, 
but unless we can occupy the insitution 
within four years we will be in dire 
straits to cope with those who will be 
in our charge by then." ( 11) 
10. It must be pointed out that or Robson refused to 
comment on the question of size to the writer. 
11. Parliamentary Debates, Vol 336, p.1402 
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In September, 1964 a tender for site works was let 
and work began on the new institution. Government 
approval was also given to the construction at Mount Eden 
Prison of a small secu~e unit for fourteen inmates. It 
was proposed that this new unit would hold the worst 
offenders until the completion of a new prison at 
Paremoremo. This unit was completed in February, 1965. 
on February 4, 1965 three inmates (including convicted 
murderer, John Frederick Gillies) escaped from Mount Eden 
at gunpoint, taking with them a warder l as hostage. The 
next day, however, they surrendered peacefully to the 
police. An inquiry into the escape by Mr. A.A. Coates, S.M. 
made a number of recommendations concerning the security of 
Mount Eden, and several of these were acted on by the 
Department. 
The "ugliest incident in New Zealand's penal 
history" occurred on July 20, 1965. An escape attempt 
by two armed remand prisoners developed into a full-scale 
riot at Mount Eden. The prison was extensively damaged 
by fire before control was regained. There was no loss of 
life or serious injury, although 293 men were held in the 
prison at the time of the riot. 
The prison was evacuated and 218 prisoners were 
transferred to other institutions. The east wing at the 
Waikeria Youth Centre was converted into a maximum 
security block for 89 of the worst offenders. A further 
31 inmates were sent to a lesser security unit at Lake 
Alice Psychiatric Hospital. 
Several days later, on July 25, a second riot occurred at 
Paparua Prison. The riot was quickly subdued, but not 
before a cell block had been badly damaged. 
As a result of the riots there were between 50-70 
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fewer beds in medium security accommodation. Mount 
Eden could hold only 200 men as compared with its previous 
capacity of 300-350. Furthermore, the use of Waikeria 
for maximum security prisoners placed a great strain upon 
the borstal system. 
The newspapers regarded the riots as a damning 
indictment of the failure of the Justice Department and 
Government, to replace Mount Eden: 
"Built first as a stockade in the 
1860's, Mount Eden has long been 
totally inadequate as a maximum 
security prison. Escapes have 
been frequent ... The inadequacies 
of Mount Eden must have been known 
to the authorities for a long time." (12) 
Mr. A.A. Coates, S.M., was appointed under a Royal 
commission to inquire into the rioting. He found that 
there was a severe shortage of staff at Mount Eden 
and expressed concern at the effect this and long hours 
of work were having upon morale and efficiency. His 
final comment was: 
12. 
"one of the ' ~ain aifficulties at 
Au~kland Prison has been the need to hold 
there under maximum security conditions 
a large and mixed prison population. 
On the night of the riot the muster 
at the prison was 293 inmates. Hardened 
criminals and petty offenders, long term 
and short term inmates, prisoners who 
can be trusted and those who are known 
security risks, and many who will resort 
to violence, have all been confined in 
this one building which is outmoded, and 
in many respects, structurally inadequate 
and inconvenient. It has been a most 
difficult task to preserve maximum 
security under these conditions. It 
is to be hoped that this situation will 
be largely remedied when the new prison 
at Paremoremo is completed. This latest 
outbreak of violence and destruction 
further emphasises the urgent need for 
Evening Post, July 21, 1965 
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that institution." (13) 
One 'beneficial' side effect of the riot at Mount 
Eden was that Cabinet gave approval to proceeed with the 
urgent construction of the new maximum security prison. 
The contract for the building of the prison was let 
in October, 1965. 
in December, 1965. 
construction work on the site began 
(vi) 1966 - 1969; 
Bad weather during the winter months of 1966 affected 
progress on 
later on in 
the project. 
( 14) 
the year, 
The New Zealand Herald reported 
however, that construction work 
was progressing steadily, and that the prison was expected 
to be completed sometime in 1968. 
The 1967 Annual Report nominated the end of June, 1968 
as the expected completion date of the new institution. 
In January, 1967, the Manawatu Evening Standard 
reported that while there had been some concern in Govern-
ment circles at the slow progress, the construction of the 
prison at Paremoremo was noi developing satisfactorily. 
The paper went on to note that: 
"The chances of escape of the criminals 
sent to the place are considered by the 
authorities to be remote." 
In December 1967, it was announced that the completion 
date of the new prison at Paremoremo might have to be 
extended from July 9, 1968 because of the delay in the 
arrival of steel grilles from Canada. 
The project architect for the Ministry of Works, 
Mr. Hitchcock, was reported in February, 1968 as stating 
that work by many specialist trades had still to be 
completed, and so it was probable that the target date 
of July 9 would not be met. 
14. New zealand ·-Herald, December, t 2, .J.966 
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As the new prison began to take shape, and the plans 
made available to the new media, it was not long before 
certain aspects of the prison attracted considerable 
p u bl i c a t t e n t i o n a n d c r i t i c i s m . 
The Auckland Star, on April 6, 1968, in an article 
entitled "The 'Intractables' Will Live Alone", stated: 
"New Zealand's toughest criminals -
the 'intractables' as the Justice 
Department calls them - will live 
virtually alone in the new Paremoremo 
maximum security jail. These men will 
need to leave their 10' by 9' windowless 
cubicles only to shower and exercise. 
They will eat alone in their cells 
(the food will be brought to them) 
and work in them at a special steel 
bench ... And all the time they will 
be under the closest guard, hemmed 
in by electric-power locked doors, 
and double-watched by closed-circuit 
television. 54 of the 250 cells at 
Paremoremo will be for 'intractables' " 
Other newspapers featured similar articles, and 
generally conveyed the impression that in constructing 
Paremoremo, the Justice Department had created an inhuman 
monster operated and controlled by sophisticated electronic 
gadgets and devices. 
or. Robson was incensed at the treatment of the new 
prison by the press. In April, 1968, he wrote to the editor 
of the New Zealand Herald requesting the newspaper to 
print a "more informed and perceptive article" on Paremoremo, 
as "some recent publicity has left many people with the 
wrong impression and it seems a pity that there should be 
this misunderstanding so early in the life of this new 
institution." 
In May 1968, or Robson wrote to Mr. Hitchcock, the 
supervising architect of Paremoremo, that: 
"The way the structure has been 
featured in the press down 
here made me quite ill and I 
felt obliged to write the 
letter to the editor." 
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There was further controversy in June 1968, when a 
. ( l 5) Sunday Times report revealed the planned conditions 
of the prison at Paremoremo and contained a legal opinion 
that solitary imprisonment in the 54 cells for intractables 
would be illegal under the Crimes Act. 
Two days later, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Hanan, 
replied that he knew of no provision in the law which would 
be contravened by conditions in the new prison at Paremoremo, 
and that the Sunday Times report was 'riddled with 
fundamental inaccuracies." 
The Auckland Star in November, 1968 reported that 
Ed Buckley, the superintendent at Mount Eden Prison, had 
been appointed Superintendent of Paremoremo. Mr. Buckley 
was described as a man who philosophy was "be firm, be 
fair, be consistent and, above all, keep your temper." 
A week before the offical opening of Paremoremo 
Prison in December, 1968, the concept and design of the 
prison was subjected to a scathing attack by or. I.F. 
McDonald, a senior lecturer in criminology at Auckland 
University. He described the prison as a 
" monument to the spirit of 
vindictive retribution. The 
concept and design of the prison 
and its system are based on 
nothing more enlightened or 
progressive than society's old-
age desire for revenge and punishment 
of the criminal." ( 16) 
The new $6 million institution was officially 
opened on December 10, 1968. In his speech at the 
opening ceremony, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Hanan, 
stated that recent prison escapes and the community's 
consternation during the time of the Mount Eden riot 
15. Sunday Times, June 23, 1968 
16. As reported in the New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1968 
justified having one institution like Paremoremo. 
Describing the achievement of the new prison as 
"something remarkable, Mr. Hanan said 
penal planners had to reconcile the 
two objectives of an environment 
which was secure and at the same time 
allow within that environment for a 
programme which would ensure that the 
±nmates could be adequately prepared 
for return to the community." 
Mr. Hanan maintained that 
"those involved in the planning 
of the prison have attempted to rid it 
as far as possible of an institutional 
character. It has not been an easy 
task to reconcile in a single building 
the two objectives of maximum security 
and humane custody and for my part 
I am well pleased with what ha\a been 
achieved," (17) 
The opening of the new prison met with general 
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approval from the newspapers. 
for example commented: 
The New Zealand Herald 
" New Zealand generally can derive 
justifiable satisfaction from the 
opening today of a new full-security 
gaol at Paremoremo .... The protection 
of society remains a primary purpose 
of any system of justice. For some 
(prisoners) ... there remains no 
alternative but imprisonment under 
conditions of absolute security ... 
Any policy which ignored such cases 
or underestimated their danger to the 
community would prejudice all the 
hopes for progressive penal reform. On 
the other hand, imprisonment under full 
security conditions, however justified, 
must not mean entombment." (18) 
There were some, however, who found the prison, and 
its electronic gadgetry, appalling. 
( 19) commented: 
The Auckland Star 
" There is little doubt that Paremoremo 
will do the job for which the money 
17. As reported in the Northland Times, December 10, 1968 
18. New Zealand Herald, December 10, 1968 
19. Auckland Star, December 7, 1968 
was primarily put up - to keep men 
society fears safely out of the way. But 
it is the very efficiency of the security 
measures that critics find dismaying. 
Paremoremo is a world removed from the 
slop-bucket squalor of the prison at 
Mount Eden. But it is too close to 
Orwell for comfort. It is society's 
contemporary nightmare cast in concrete, 
steel and shock-proof glass." 
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In a similar vein, a letter to the editor of the 
Evening Star remarked:· (20) 
"Here we have an institution 
reminiscent of George Orwell's 
'1984' of Big Brother Watching You -
where a human being is scareely given 
a chance at all and is scarcely a 
human being any more. The latest in 
electronic equipment is hardly what is 
needed to prove that any man is a 
worthwhile person." 
Towards the end of March, 1969 the transfer of 
inmates to Parernorerno began. 
20. Evening Star, December, 9 1968 
• 
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SECTION 5 CONCLUSION: 
PART 1: ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAREMOREMO 
There can be little disagreement over the decision 
to replace Mount Eden Prison with a new institution which 
would cater for many of New Zealand's hardened criminal 
population. Events in the 1950's and 1960's confirmed the 
widely-held belief that Mount Eden was an ancient, 
antiquated and totally inadequate institution. 
The unfortunate characteristic of Mount Eden Prison 
was that it was, as Barnett once put it, "distressingly 
durable". Improvements to the institution from time to 
time provided the Government of the day with a ready 
excuse to justify the retention of Mount Eden as New 
Zealand's maximum security jail. But by 1961 the Govern-
ment had finaily realised that a decision to replace Mount 
Eden could not be deferred any longer. 
Government acknowledgement of the need to relieve 
the serious overcrowding and unsatisfactory conditions 
in Mount Eden Prison, meant that the Justice Department was 
confronted with the very real problem of finding an 
alternative to Mount Eden. Three different options 
were open to the Department: 
(1) construct a large maximum security institution 
which would hold most of New Zealand's hardened 
criminals and security risks. 
(2) construct a small secure institution which would 
accommodate only the very small number of inmates 
who required top maximum security. 
(3) construct two or three small maximum-security 
blocks within some of the medium security institutions 
in the country. 
The Department opted for the first alternative 
apparently without much investigation or discussion 
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over the feasibility of implementing eitherof the other 
two alternatives. However, before discussing the issue 
of the size of the institution, the question which must 
be considered initially is, "Why was the policy of 
concentrating hard-core prisoners in the one institution 
preferred to a policy of dispersing those prisoners 
among a number of secure prisons ? " 
( 1) 
One reason for the preference of a policy of 
concentration lies in the fact that the penal administration 
of this country has generally adhered to a policy of 
detaining certain types of offenders and inmates in 
specially designated institutions. This policy had its 
genesis in Hume's classification system and by the 1930's 
it had become a standard practice - the more dangerous 
and intractable prisoners, for example, were detained 
at Mount Eden, sexual offenders were held at New Plymouth 
Prison and so on. 
During the 1950's and 1960's the Justice Department 
continued its policy of concentrating at Mount Eden those 
prisoners who required the highest degree of security, 
although in some rare instances, troublesome groups of 
inmates were broken up by dispersing some prisoners to 
other institutions around the country. 
Another reason for departmental preferenc e of a 
policy of concentration was basically an economic one: 
'intractable' prisoners, though only a very small percentage 
of the total prison population, absorbed a disproportionate 
amount of the Justice Department's limited resources. It 
was considered that if an institution existed that was 
suitable to cater for these 'intractables' then those 
limited resources could be applied more effectively and 
more economically. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the issue of 
1. The debate over the advantages and disadvantages of 
concentration and dispersal of maximum security inmates 
will be examined in Part 2. 
.. 
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concentration of maximum security prisoners in one 
institution did not generate much debate,if any, within 
the Department. The decision was therefore made that 
Mount Eden Prison would be replaced by a new maximum 
security prison which would hold all 'intractable' 
prisoners and inmates who were considered security risks. 
(i) Size: 
It was to be expected that the question of the size 
of Paremoremo was attended by discussion and disagreement. 
Some administrators contended that a large prison 
was necessary as there was a sizeable number of inmates 
who required maximum security detention. 
in 1965 said: 
One memorandum 
" ..... It is generally recognised that 
10% to 15% of a prison population 
should be held in maximum security. our 
needs have been assessed at a higher 
level, but it must be remembered that 
we strive to keep offenders in the 
community longer than any other country. 
Thus we could expect to have a higher 
percentage of hard core criminals." 
The supporters of the size of the prison justified 
their claims by citing the results of surveys carried out 
of the security groupings of inmates in custody. The 
fact that these surveys were, by their very nature, likely 
to be erroneous in no way doubted many administrators from 
using the results as justification for a number of inmates 
which Paremoremo should accommodate. 
Others within the Department argued that the prison 
should cater for fluctuations in prison population and 
therefore, should be as large as possible. They cited 
the example of Mount Eden during the 1950's and early 
( 2) 
2. It is interesting to note that the Mountbatten Report in 
1967 proposed that inmates requiring maximum security be 
detained in a custom-built high security prison to be 
constructed on the Isle of Wight. In 1968, however, the 
Advisorry council on the Penal System recommended the 
dispersal of high-security prisoners. 
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l960's as a compelling reason for the construction of 
a large institution. 
on the other hand, there were many who claimed that 
Paremoremo was too large - that there were no more than 
40 to 50 inmates in the whole of New Zealand who required 
maximum security custody. Furthermore, it was argued that 
if a large prison was built, many inmates who were not true 
maximum security material would be sent there; in other 
words, that medium security inmates would be detained in 
a maximum security institution; this in turn would have 
a detrimental effect on those inmates. 
In October, 1963, Mr. J. Hobson, the Superintendent 
of Waikune Prison (and now Superintendent of Parernorerno) 
wrote to or. Robson over the question of the size of the 
new institution: 
"Even with future projections -
population growth, increased 
reception rate, and more liberal 
policies - probation, periodic 
detention, youth centre, etc. we 
doubt if the prison population of 
New Zealand warrants a maximum 
security institution of this calibre 
to cater for as many as 240 inmates 
.... To allow for a maximum of 150 
would, we feel, be nearer the mark." 
In 1965 the commission of inquiry into the rioting 
at Mount Eden alluded to the very real problem of holding 
a large and mixed prison population under conditions of 
maximum security. The commission noted that it was a 
most difficult task to preserve maximum security in such 
a situation. 
During the debate in Parliament on the riot at Mount 
Eden, the Hon. M. Moohan (Petone) remarked that it would be 
a waste of public money to build a maximum security prison 
to house 240 prisoners, and he asked the Minister of 
Justice to consider the construction of a prison to house 
5 0 , or at the most , 1 O O inmates . ( 3 ) 
3 • Parliamentary Debates, vol 343, p.1450 
• 
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The criticisms levelled at the number of inmates that 
Paremoremo was to accommodate received further impeuus 
in 1968, when the Advisory council on the Penal System 
issued its report on "The Regime for Long-Term Prisoners 
in conditions of Maximum Security. 11 ( 4 ) The report 
estimated that there were only 138 prisoners in the whole 
of the United Kingdom who required maximum security 
custody. one can merely speculate as to what impact, if 
any, this report would have had on the size of Paremoremo 
had it been released in 1960 instead of 1968. 
If the Department had hoped that the opening of 
Paremoremo would silence much of the criticism made of the 
size of the institution, then it was sadly mistaken; on the 
contrary the criticisms became more pronounced. 
a minute to the Secretary of Justice noted that: 
For example, 
II ( 1) Paremoreremo is conceived 
on the wrong principles. i.e. 
248 maximum security prisoners. 
(2) We have no more than 10-20 
intractables in New Zealand at 
any one time. 
( 3) Therefore, we need only a 
small maximum security prison 
to accommodate those inmates -
a capacity of 40 would see us 
out for the next 10 - 20 years." ( 5) 
Similarly, the 1972 Report by Sir Guy Powles and Mr. 
L.G.H. Sinclair S.M., into "Various Matters Pertaining 
to Paremoremo Prison" stated: 
4. 
II . This is supposed to be a maximum security 
prison, and thus only maximum security 
risks should be sent there ... On the best 
of authority we learn that there may be up 
to a maximum of 40 men in Paremoremo who 
really need maximum security detention. 
This means that Paremoremo is being used 
as a medium security prison, when it does 
not have the proper facilities for such, 
and the men suffer accordingly." (my emphasis) 
H.M.S.O. r 
5. Minute to the Secretary of Justice from the Director 
of Penal Education, 16 December, 1971 
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Why was such a large prison built? 
The answer to this question hinges largely on the 
role played by or. Robson, the Secretary of Justice at 
the time. There is no reason to suppose that Dr. Robson 
was an ardent advocate of the size of Paremoremo; indeed 
he was on record as stating that not only was there too 
high a percentage of inmates held in maximum security 
conditions, but also that no institution should hold more 
than 100-150 inmates. 
Why then did Dr. Robson sanction the construction of 
a maximum security prison which would hold up to 250 
inmates? 
In the writer's opinion, there were three major 
reasons which influenced Dr Robson's decision to settle 
on an intitituion the size of Paremoremo. 
( 1) Pressure from departmental colleagues 
The decision to build a large maximum security 
prison in place of Mount Eden came at a time when many 
penal administrators were on the verge of despair; there 
was severe overcrowding in many penal institutions; many 
prisons were outmoded, obsolete and totally inadequate 
to carry out an effective role in a modern penal system; 
departmental efforts at obtaining finance from Government 
for the construction of new institutions had been constantly 
rebuffed; there was a serious shortage of staff; and so on. 
It is not surprising then that these disenchanted 
administrators demanded the construction of a large prison. 
They had learned a number of important lessons from events 
in the 1950's and early 1960's. 
The first lesson was that prisons must cater for 
fluctuations in penal policy. Many administrators contended 
54. 
that, judging from New Zealand penal history, Paremoremo was 
going to last a very long time; therefore, they argued, 
it shouldbe built as large as possible in order to cater 
for the expected increase in numbers of maximum security 
inmates in 20 or 30 years time. While on present 
indications it was hard to justify the erection of such 
a large institution, the passage of time would prove 
them correct. Indeed, Sir Roy Jack, the former Minister 
of Justice, recently remarked that: 
" some people had asserted that 
Paremoremo was too large for the 
number of maximum security cases in 
New Zealand .... However, it had to be 
borne in mind that the institution 
had been designed to fulfil its 
functions for many years to come." ( 6) 
Another factor was that penal administrators wanted 
never to be faced with the same situation as confronted 
them in the 19SO's and 1960's. They w ere determined 
that the problems of overcrowding, escapes, obsolete 
institutions, etc., should be overcome so that the 
Department was never again 'caught with its pants down'. 
Governmental indifference and inaction over the deficiencies 
of many institutions, and especially Mount Eden, strengthened 
the determination of many departmental officials to ensure 
that the situation never arose again. 
A third lesson learned was that governments are liable 
to procrastinate on matters of penology; governments 
have traditionally been extremely loathe to allocate finance 
for the construction of urgently required institutions. 
As the Auckland Star sagely remarked: 
( 7) 
"They were not going to turn down 
the chance of getting Cabinet 
approval for the biggest secure 
prison p9ssible. 11 
6. Press release on September 11, 1972 
7. Auckland Star, December 7, 1968 
( 2) 
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The impression that there was a sizable number 
of inmates who needed maximum security detention -
The publicity given by the press to the escapes, 
inmate unrest and riots at Mount Eden during the 1950's 
and 1960's created the impression that there was a large 
number of inmates who needed to be held in conditions 
of maximum security. Because of this publicity, the 
public believed that many of Mount Eden's inmates were 
recalcitrant and dangerous prisoners; likewise, many 
departmental officials were convinced that a high percentage 
of the prison population were maximum security material. 
This unfortunate impression reinforced the belief in many 
people's minds that a large prison was necessary. 
( 3) Public Opinion -
A third reason which can be advanced in explanation 
of the size of Paremoremo, and one which is intimately 
connected with the reason cited immediately above, is that, 
essentially, Paremoremo was a sop to public opinion. or. 
Robson was a publicist par excellence; not only did he 
realise the value and potency of public opinion, but he was 
also aware that public opinion can be moulded and influenced. 
He was convinced that to have a success:ul and progressive 
penal policy, public opinion must support the measures 
you propose; nothing can be achieved in the face of a 
hostile and intransigent community attitude. or. Robson 
was well aware of the public consternation over the 
inadequacy of Mount Eden; further more, he was equally 
well aware that this consternation might jeopardise public 
t f . 1 l . . ( 
8 ) tl 
accep ance o progressive pena po icies. Consequen y, 
if Mount Eden was replaced with an institution which would 
hold all those prisoners whose escape would cause public 
alarm, then the battle would be half won . or. Robson was, 
therefore, undoubtedly swayed in his deliberations by his 
conception of the type of institution which the public wanted. 
8. Indeed, or. Robson once remarked that: 
" ... A maximum security prison is an anchor for the whole 
penal system, but once the anchor begins to drag then we 
are confronted with grave problems •internal as well as 
external. 1' - Australia and N. z. Jo. of criminology 
(Dec. 1971): 4,4, p.203 
(ii) Design -
one criticism which has been consistently levelled 
against Paremoremo is that its design borders on the 
inhumane. 
or. I.F. McDonald was critical of what he termed 
as "the zoo-like environment at Paremoremo: 
"The prisoners ... will be exposed to 
view at all times in cells that seem 
more like rows and storeys of cages. 
It is clear that the whole concept 
is based on a view of prisoners 
as wild animals. If a man is not 
a wild animal when he enters Paremoremo 
then he will almost certainly become 
one after suffering such treatment. 
The environment is a constant reminder 
of restriction and degradation." ( 9) 
The Auckland Star described Paremoremo as 
II society's contempoary nightmare cast 
in concrete, steel and shock-proof glass.: 
In December 1969 the New Zealand Institute of 
Architects publication said: 
"A medieval castle often had a prison 
or oubliette in the entrance tower. 
Security was ensured by 20 foot thick 
stone walls, possibly below moat level 
and access limited to a trapdoor in 
the porch-floor above. The new maximum 
security prison at Paremoremo uses 
more sophisticated techniques ... The 
design of this prison shows that this 
is an organisation which wants a 
controllable, static, even rigid, state 
of suspended animation. It does not 
favour individual, spontaneous, non-
conforming action. That situation 
makes life very hard for \'cll trained 
modern prison staff. Here they find 
themselves in a system that is so 
complex that they dare not but follow 
the book." 
( 10) 
56. 
9, As reported in the New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1968 
10. Auckland Star, December 7, 1968 
e 
57. 
Professor J. Spencer, a British sociologist, 
' ' d h ' II' h II (11) describe t e prison as in uman . 
Others have claimed that Paremoremo is far too 
secure and that this, in turn leads to inmate frustration 
and resentment. In October, 1970 the New Zealand Herald 
featured an article entitled "Is Paremoremo Too Secure?~ 
"What Paremoremo needs is a couple of 
successful escapes ... The trouble at the 
maximum security prison, which has 
several times led to violence, is serious -
and only radical measures will ease it ••. 
The fundamental trouble at Paremoremo 
is psychological. Anyone who has visited 
the prison will agree that one emerges 
not so much impressed by its security 
as appalled byit. 
When the prison was built, the first 
requirement was that, regardless of 
cost, it should be absolutely Houdini-
proof. In this aim at least, the 
designers have been completely success-
ful .... Indeed, as anyone will know who 
has been caught where he does not want 
to be, the . thought of escape can become an 
obsession as powerful as the impulse 
of flight in a trapped animal. Put men 
in an electronically controlled steel-
and-concrete fortress like Paremoremo 
and their insti~ctive urge for freedom 
must appear foredoomed. Against human 
agencies they can put their wits; against :·. 
this inhuman, mechanical monster they feel 
powerless. Resentment grows into fury 
and fury that cannot be vented on doors 
and walls falls on the human symbol of 
one's frustrations - the warder . 
..... Far brighter, cleaner, better 
equipped than Mount Eden it may well be, 
but this 'model' prison is beset by 
infinitely more tension and strife than 
that gloomy old dungeon ever was." (12) 
The prison, however, has not been without its 
apologists. 
11. 
12. 
New Zealand Herald, 
New Zealand Herald, 
April 6, 197J. 
23 October, 1970 
Mr.c.H. Rolph, a British crimin•logist, stated 
that the prison: 
" . does everything a maximum 
security prison ought to do in 
the way of imagining and fore-
stalling escape methods, but it 
is a perfect illustration of how 
much freedom and open training 
there can be inside a really secure 
perimeter." 
58. 
The New Zealand Howard . League for Penal Reform 
similarly voiced its approval of Paremoremo . 
" . . The new prison will be a much 
more sanitary and humane place than 
the old prison at Mount Eden and 
inmates will respond ·to the better 
and more comfortable surroundings 
at Paremoremo ... Inmates living 
under the better conditions at 
paremoremo will be much less victims 
of the frustrations, depressions, 
hopelessness and bitterness which 
are so common among prisoners." (13) 
Likewise, the Minster of Justice, Mr. Hanan,lavishly 
praised the concept and design of the new institution. 
Why was such a secure prison built? 
The answer to this question again hinges on the role of 
or. Robson, Much the same reasons which were advanced 
above as influencing the size of the prison also influenced · 
its design. 
Perhaps, however, the question of public relations is 
more important in this context. The public were sick 
and tired of the seemingly endless procession of escapes 
from Mount Eden; they demanded an institution which would 
effectively contain all dangerous prisoners. or. Robson 
realised the effect that escapes had on public attitudes; 
,. ~ 13. As reported in the New Zealand Herald, January 18,1960 I 
59. 
he was apprehensive of the influence on public opinion 
of publicity given to escapes and riots. For example, 
this article appeared in the Evening Post after the Mount 
Eden riot in 1965: 
"The (Justice) Department has been 
sowing the seeds of penal reform 
in the shape of rehabilitation rather 
than punishment. After this week's 
riot no doubt many people will say: 
"I told you so. See what happens 
when you let the psychologists loose 
in a prison." 
.. Those prisoners considered beyond 
reformation should be shut away and 
forgotten about .... Although its 
prison reforms programme may have 
lost a lot of ground and may even 
seem to have failed, there is still a 
case for rehabilitation rather than 
punishment for many of the persons 
in our prisons. 
If the entire effort is devoted to 
these people and men like Wilder and 
La Mattina are just put away and 
forgotten about, then prison reform 
measures will be worthwhile." (14) 
(my em p has i s ) 
It was this very sort of article which or. Robson 
hoped to silence by the construction of an extremely secure 
institution. Never again wouldthe ,public be subjected to 
alarm because of prison escapes, ri0ts, etc.; prisoners 
whose escape would cause public concern would be shut away 
and detained in an institution where escape would be a 
virtual impossibility. 
CONCLUSION: 
Paremoremo was conceived, designed and built during 
Dr. Robson's reign as Secretary of Justice. Yet this 
institution, which distinctly smacks of regressive penal 
thinking, stands in marked contrast to the progressive 
14. Evening Post, . 23 July, 1963 
60. 
measures (such as periodic detention, release-to-work, 
etc) which the Justice Department introduced and implemented 
tM . underAaegis of or. Robson. 
Why then did Dr. Robson sanction the construction of 
Paremoremo, an institution which is difficult to reconcile 
with his much vaunted progressive penal policy, 
Several reasons have been advanced in this paper 
in explanation of Dr. Robson's approval of the concept 
of Paremoremo. Yet one is left with the uneasy feeling 
that these reasons are merely peripheral to the whole 
issue. If the reasons cited above are regarded as 
conclusive, then the implication arises that or. Robson 
was incredibly naive as to the possible effects on inmates 
and staff of an institution like Paremoremo. But to 
label the man as naive is to ignore aa reality: or. 
Robson was generally regarded as an astute, able and, at 
times, ruthless administrator who was exceedingly well 
versed in matters of penal policy. To argue that he could 
not have foreseen the possibility of trouble at Paremoremo is to 
distort the facts. 
Perhaps the answer to this perplexing problem is that 
or. Robson,while recognising that inherent dangers existed 
in an institution like Paremoremo, sincerely believed that 
it would effectively serve a dual purpose: 
(1) That it would detain in extremely 
secure conditions, all those inmates 
who were considered security risks and 
whose escape would cause great public 
concern; 
and 
(2) That the high degree of security at the 
perimeter would provide for more scope for 
freedom of movement within the institution. 
• 
61. 
or. Robson was certainly conscious of the public 
demand that the new institution be extremely secure; yet 
at the same time, he was convinced that the prison had 
to provide for humane custody - Paremoremo was not going 
to be merely a human garbage disposal unit. 
It would be reasonable to assume that or. Robson 
hoped that the modern facilities and amenities at 
Paremoremo would be sincerely appreciated by the maximum 
security inmates, especially those who had experienced 
imprisonment within the confines of Mount Eden . 
unfortunately, as recent events have shown, this 
was a vain hope. or. Robson completely misjudged the very 
nature of the institution he built at Paremoremo. While 
it provided facilities far superior to those at Mount Eden 
or Mount Crawford, the inmates resented the cold, impersonal 
a~ supe~efficient character of the institution. 
Sir Guy Powles once remarked that the troubles at 
Paremoremo lay in the nature of the institution itself. 
Departmental overemphasis on security has resulted in the 
construction of an institution which will never be 
trouble-free unless radical measures are taken to alter 
its constitution and character. 
Paremoremo stands today as a monument to a hope which 
never eventuated. one wonders whether it will become the 
Mount Eden of 2073. 
62. 
PART (2) SOME PROBLEMS OF MAXIMUM SECURITY IMPRISONMENT: 
( 1) The classification of Prisoners - Who Needs Maximum 
Security Imprisonment? 
"To be classified as maximum security implies 
that the person is unable to function in another 
setting and is perceived as being dangerous to 
the community, staff or other inmates. It also 
implies that the person in this category has 
serious problems in inter-personal relationsships 
and in coping with situations which demand self-
control and the acceptance of limits. unfortunately 
a paradox develops since the imposition of maximum 
external controls tends to diminish the development 
of internal ones on the part of the inmate." 
Design of Federal Maximum Security 
Institutions (Special Report No. 1 
Department of the Solicitor-General, 
Ottawa, Npvember 30, 1971) at p. 14. 
"The only sort of men who will have to be 
sent to Paremoremo are vicious men bent 
on violence, the dangerous psycopath, the 
aggressive simpleton and the periodic 
psychotic." 
Editorial in the Manawatu Evening .. 
Standard, December 14, 1968 
One of the greatest problems of maximum security 
imprisonment is to determine what sort of inmate should 
be detained in high-security custody. 
council on the Penal System stated in 
As the Advisory 
( l) 
its report: 
"We are very doubtful if it is possible 
1. "The Regime for Long-Term Prisoners in conditions of 
Maximum Security", H.M.)O., at p.15 
to select 80, or 100, or 120, of the 
long-term prisoners now in custody and 
to be sure that they require a different 
degree of security than other prisoners 
The proposal to do so presupposes a 
degree of accuracy in the processes of 
selection that is unlikely to be achieved 
and places a weight on the selection 
processes that they are not really able 
to bear." 
63. 
Unfortunately there has never been any consistent 
agreement on the criteria that should be employed in 
classifying prisoners as "maximum Security" material. 
The Mountbatten Report 
Following the escape of George Blake from Wormwood 
Scrubs prison in England, the Home Secretary appointed 
Lord Mountbatten to inquire into prison escapes and 
. h' 12 ) d security. In is report Lor Mountbatten 
recommended that prisoners should be divided into four 
main categories according to their security risk: 
Category A - Prisoners whose escape would be highly 
dangerous to the public or the police 
or the security of the State. 
category B - Prisoners for whom the very highest 
conditions of security are not necessary 
but for whom escape must be made very 
difficult. 
category c - Prisoners who cannot be trusted in open 
conditions but who do not have the ability 
or resources to make a determined escape 
attempt. 
category D - Those who can reasonably be trusted to 
serve their sentences in open conditions. 
According to the Report, only those prisoners in 
Cagetory A required maximum security custody. 
2. Report of the Inquiry · into Prison Escapes and Security 
Cmd 3175.166 - paragraphs 212 and 217. 
• 
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The British Government accepted these recommendations 
and in pursuance of them the Prison Department drew up 
early in 1967 a first list of 138 male convicted prisoners 
who were placed in category A. 
The Report of the Advisory Council on the Penal System: 
The Advisory council was asked to consider the 
regime for long-term prisoners detained in conditions 
of maximum security, and its report was released in 
March, 1968. 
The council undertook a study of the characteristiscs 
of category A prisoners. It was found that all were long 
sentence prisoners. Furthermore, the bulk of the prisoners 
in category A 
"are young, or fairly young, violent 
professional criminals who are both 
dangerous and persistent in their 
criminal activities. Many of them are 
difficult to control even inside prison. 
Where their most recent conviction is 
not for murder or manslaughter it is 
usually for robbery with v io lence or 
a more serious assatil.t (Taking the 
category A prisoners as a whole, for 
130 about whom the information was 
available .... on1y ·12 had had no 
conviction for personal violence out-
side prison). These violent criminals 
seem to have had decreasing periods of 
liberty between sentences and by and 
large to have committed increasingly 
serious crimes. They tend to have no 
legitimate regular employment and 
to have disordered personal and family 
lives." (3) 
l( 
In addition, category A prisoners were liable to 
escape. Of 138, 51 had escaped or attempted to escape 
from prison during their present or previous sentences 
and as many as 83 were suspected of making escape plans 
during their current sentence. 
3 • Op • c it . , at p . 8 
The Report noted that: 
"There was general agreement that 
only a relatively small proportion of the 
3,000 long-term prisoners now in prison 
were really dangerous people whose 
escape from custody must be prevented 
at virtually all costs, but no agreement 
on how small or large that proportion 
was, and a wider divergence of views 
on the meaning of dangerousness." ( 4) 
65. 
The council, unfortunately, did not lay down any 
specific criteria for deciding which inmates required 
maximum security imprisonment. The Report, however, 
did outline several reasons for which it might be 
necessary to place a long-term prisoners in conditions 
of maximum security: 
(1) If there is reason to think from his past record 
that he may plan an escape attempt 
(2) If a prisoner's previous record, and the interval 
of time between his last release from custody 
and his most recent conviction, suggest that if 
he escaped he would at once revert to the 
commission of further very serious offences, such 
as robbery with violence. 
(3) A prisoner's record may suggest that if he escaped 
he would use firearms to resist arrest. 
(4) The prisoner is one of the small group of prisoners 
who are liable, if at liberty, seriously to injure 
or to kill women or young children. 
(5) Where a prisoner is so notorious that his escape 
' would be a national scandal, and gravely damage 
the repute of the prison service. 
other than outlining these very vague reasons, the 
report provided no basis on which to identify those 
prisoners who need the very highest degree of security 
which a prison system can provide . 
4. Op, cit. at p,10 
66. 
The 'Design of Federal Maximum Security Institutions' 
( 5) 
Special Report: 
This special report recommended that only inmates 
who met the following criteria should be confined in a 
maximum security institution: 
(a) ( i) those who actively try to escape and will 
be dangerous to the public if they do. 
(ii) those who are actually or potentially 
dangerous to staff, or other inmates; 
(b) those who are not primarily psychiatric cases. 
Classification at Paremoremo 
The criteria outlined in the Mountbatten Report 
and in the Canadian Report are probably the best guidelines 
in determining the classification of maximum security 
prisoners. 
What then are the criteria used by the Justice 
Department in deciding who is sent to Paremoremo ?(
6
) 
In the 1972 Annual Report of the Justice Department, 
the Secretary of Justice, Mr. Missen, referred to the 
type of inmate detained at Paremoremo: 
"The community - rightly expects that 
offenders who have shown themselves 
to be a serious menance to society will 
be held in conditions offering little, 
if any, chance of escape. Paremoremo 
houses this class of offender. It also 
houses inmates who have escaped from or 
have been serious disruptive elements 
in other institutions. Finally it receives 
all men sentenced to life imprisonment in 
the first place, though they may later be 
transferred elsewhere," 
Similarly, Sir Roy Jack, 
Justice, referred recently in 
the former Minister of 
a press statement to 
5. Special Report No, 1, Department of the Solicitor-General 
Ottawa, November 30, 1971. 
6, Unfortunately, the Department would not provide me with 
the criteria which is employed in maximum security 
classification. 
. ( 
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the classification policy pursued by the Justice 
Department in deciding whether to transfer an inmate 
to Paremoremo: 
"There has been some misunderstanding 
as to the purpose for which the prison 
had been designed. This was firstly 
to provide for the safe custody of 
offenders whose escape would pose a 
serious threat to the public; secondly 
to provide for the safe custody of those 
who although not classified as 
dangerous had in fact escaped or were 
thought likely to escape from medium 
security prisons; thirdly, for the 
proper control of inmates~ ~hile not 
escape risks, were a disturbing 
influence in less heavily staffed 
institutions. Examples were active 
homosexuals, traffickers in drugs or 
men prone to violence. Finally, as a 
matter of public policy, all prisoners 
sentenced to life imprisonment are now 
initially held at Premoremo." (7) 
It is obvious, therefore, that the criteria used 
by the Justice Department for maximum security classification 
are couched in wider terms than those set out in the Mount-
batten and Canadian reports. This means that some inmates 
who are, at best, medium security risks, are being detained 
in maximum security conditions at Paremoremo. Indeed, the 
report by Sir Guy Powles and Mr. L.G.H. Sinclair into 
'various Matters Pertaining to Paremoremo Prison' noted 
that out of a muster at Paremoreremo of 163, only about 
40 could be considered as real 'maximum security' material. 
The report pointed out that: 
"this means that Paremoremo is being 
used as a medium security prison when 
it does not have the proper facilities 
for such, and the men suffer accordingly ••. " 
The report concluded: 
" too many medium (or less) security 
risks are confined in this maximum 
security prison. This is unfair to the 
7. Press Release, 11 September, 1972 
men concerned, depriving them of the 
opportunity to rehabilitate under more 
open conditions and with at least some 
better opportunity for contact with 
people and with nature in the form of 
grass, plants and animals. Even for 
maximum security risks, to spend 
nearly three years under such conditions 
as it the case with some, must have a 
dehumanising effect, however necessary 
this type of confinement may be deemed 
to be.·~· 
68. 
In a further report released in March, 1973 Sir 
Guy Powles and Mr. Sinclair stated that the present 
standard of security were needed for approximately two-
thirds of the inmates. This figure points to a substantial 
increase in the number of inmates considered to require 
maximum security custody. 
The report considered that the remaining one-third 
be transferred to less ~cure accommodation: 
( 8) 
"If they remain at Paremoremo 
they are subject to the disruptive 
effects of the others, and their very 
isolation precludes any programme that 
could prepare them for integration into 
the social whole. We believe th~t it 
is in their interest, and ultimately, 
in the public interest, that they be 
moved to medium security conditions." 
Conclusion: 
The detention of medium and minimum security risks 
in an institution 1 ike P a:r.:emor /emo highlights "the folly 
inherent in the intitial construction of an institution 
of this nature and size in a country the size of New Zealand
!' 
Furthermore, as both Powles/Sinclair reports note, confine-
ment in this institution seriously affects the individual's 
rehabilitation. The onus lies on the Justice Department to 
ensure that only those inmates who really require maximum 
( 10) 
security custody are sent to Paremoremo. 
8. In the 1973 Annual Report, Mr. Missen stated that almost all of 
these irunates had been transferred to lesser security institutions 
before the report was presented in March 1973. 
9. N. Cameron- "Report of the New Zealand Department of Justice" -Aus
t. 
and N.Z. Jo. of Crim. (March 1973); 6, 1. at p.60 
( 9) 
10. It is worth noting that the daily average muster at Paremoremo in 
1972 
was 145 as against an actual capacity of 250. This indicates 
commendable restraint on the part of the Department. 
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PART ( 2) : CONCENTRATION VERSUS DISPERSAL 
There are two ways in which a penal system may attempt 
to deal with maximum security prisoners: 
1. 
2. 
concentration: 
Dispersal: 
the first way is t _0 place such 
prisoners together in one maximum 
security institution. 
the second way is to spread these 
prisoners among a number of secure 
prisons. 
The choice between concentration and dispersal is 
a difficult one; there are strong arguments on both sides, 
and "neither solution is a panacea."(G) 
1. CONCENTRATION 
The Arguments in Favour of Concentration 
(i) The strongest argument in favour of concentration 
is that the presence of a small number of maximum 
security inmates in a medium security institution 
6. 
7 • 
can harm its regime. In the interests of the 
development of a liberal regime in medium security 
institutions,.and in the interests of the rehabilitation 
of the prisoners in these prisons, the worst inmates 
should be detained elsewhere. This argument is 
referred to by the Advisory council in its report:(?). 
"First, the governor and his staff 
might be so anxious to prevent the 
escape of a few very dangerous prisoners 
that restrictions had to be placed on 
the movement and activities of all 
prisoners. Second, the staff might be so 
concerned, and rightly concerned, with 
the control of a few prisoners, and 
the prevention of their escape, that they 
would not be able to devote enough time 
and thought to the treatment of the 
majority. Third, the influence of a few 
evil men exercised partly by intimidation 
and the threats of violence against 
other prisoners, and partly by the 
manipulation of situations and grievances, 
would permeate the whole prison, and 
militate against all the efforts of 
Report on '_T_h_e __ R_e--=g_i_m_e_f_o_r_L_o_n_g..__-_T_e_r_m __ P_r_1_· _s_o_n_e_r_s""--_i_n __ c_o_n_d_i_t_i_o_n--'-s 
of Maximum Security' at p.13 
Ibid p.16 
the staff. It was argued to 
us that persistent escapers 
always plotting some new way to 
escape, troublemakers, those of 
an incurable disposition to 
disobey rules, and those deter-
mined to dominate the prison 
cannot be handled in an ordinary 
prison without restricting the 
general regime, and maintaining a 
several range of custodial measures". 
7 1. 
(ii) The penal system can hold all its bad eggs in the 
one basket. A small maximum security prison, with a 
high staff ratio and with a mature and experienced 
staff, would enable difficult prisoners to receive a 
degree of individual treatment impossible in a larger 
prison. 
(iii) A liberal regime can be built up on the basis of 
good security and of good relations between staff 
and prisoners. 
(iv) Experiental methods 
an institution. 
could be tried out in such 
( V) It is economical, The concentration of dangerous 
inmates in the one institution reduces the necessity 
for multiplication of facilities and specialist 
staff. Efforts can be directed at one institution. 
Arguments against concentration: 
(1) "If there were only one such prison in the system 
all the prisoners sent there would be publically 
labelled as the worst. Once a prisoner has been 
allocated to trat prison it would be illogical to move 
him elsehwere until such time as it was felt that 
security precautions could be somewhat reduced for 
him, (
8
) In all likelihood, the dominant atmosphere 
of such an institution could hardly fail to be 
excessively custodial. 
8. Ibid., p.14 
72. 
(ii) "There is a danger that the atm6sphere might also 
become more repressive with the staff attitudes 
becoming affected by their anxieties about the 
attitudes and activities of a concentrated group of 
evil men who felt themselves finally rejected by 
society and who felt they had nothing to gain by co-
operation and nothing to lose by revolt. ( 9 ) There 
are inherent dangers in concentrating in one small 
prison, a hundred or more criminal minds whose 
energies and ingenuity might be expended on plans for 
escape or on conflict with authority. 
(iii) Thereis a danger of such a prison becoming a "chokey-
block" where the toughest inmates square up to the 
toughest officers. 
(iv) A more basic argument against concentration lies in the 
difficulty of classification. Is it possible to 
select 100 or 120 inmates and to be sure that they 
require a different degree of security than other 
prisoners? A policy of concentration must be 
backed up by an extremely efficient classification 
system. 
(v) A maximum security prison is, by its very nature, 
inflexible and extremely difficult to adapt to changes 
in penal policy. The decision to build a maximum 
security prison presupposes that there will always be 
a substantial number of inmates who require maximum 
security custody. Such an attitude ignores the very 
basic fact that penal policy changes, often rapidly, 
and that the prison may be obsolete and toolly inadequate 
within a matter of years. 
( 2) DISPERSAL 
Arguments in Favour of Dispersal 
Many of the arguments advanced against concentration 
9. Ibid,, p.14 
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can also be utilised as justification for a policy of 
dispersal. Other reasons are: 
(i) The removal of persistent trouble-makers to a 
special maximum security prison may only result 
in the appearance of fresh leaders to take their 
place. 
(ii) A prisoner who is a trouble-maker at one prison, or 
at one stage of his sentence, may settle down in 
another prison and at another stage of his sentence. 
The Advisory council on the Penal System was 
impressed by the example of Alcatraz(lO) 
"This American evidence reinforced our 
view that to move the most recalcitrant 
prisoners to a small maximum security 
prison, and to leave them there, is 
likely to increase the number of 
apparently incorrigible prisoners with 
whom the system as a whole has to cope." (11) 
(iii) A policy of dispersal allows for more flexibility 
in penal planning. The penal system is not tied 
to a rigid, inflexible maximum security institution 
which it must fill. 
10. Between the Wars ·· the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons 
adopted the concept of concentration, andfor a time 
sent their most difficult prisoners to Alcatraz. They 
were then forced by a combination of financial and other 
circumstanc~s to abandon that site and decided not to 
build a new Alcatraz, but to adopt instead a measure of 
dispersal. When Alcatraz was closed, and its inmates 
dispersed to other very secure prisons, the majority 
settled down into their new communities. Some prisoners 
who had been very difficult and recalc~rant at Alcatraz 
and for whom there seemed no hope, had behaved very much 
better when moved. A small proportion of these prisoners 
were still very dangerous and disruptive, but the general 
regime of the other prisons was not jeopardised. 
11. Ibid, p.17 
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The Arguments against Dispersal: 
Again, many of the reasons put forward in favour 
of a policy of concentration militate against a policy 
of dispersal. 
Possibly the strongest argument against dispersal is 
that the presence of some maximum security inmates in a medium 
security prison may severely restrict the type of regime 
within the institution, and gravely affect the rehabilitation 
of other inmates. 
conclusion: 
Paremoremo is a living example of a policy of 
concentration. In the 1972 Annual Report of the Justice 
Department, Mr Missen remarked: 
"I believe that at Paremoremo we avoid 
the worst disadvantages and achieve some of 
the benefits of concentration. The prison 
has three standard cell blocks together 
with a classification block and a separate 
block for the most fractious and difficult 
inmates. This avoids the dangers of 
bringing together in isolation a small 
group comprised of the most difficult and 
dangerous offenders and provides opportunity 
for more relaxed conditions wit~in secure 
boundaries." 
It is considered, however, that much of the trouble 
at Paremoremo lies in this policy of detaining at that 
institution all the most dangerous inmates in New Zealand. 
One can conclude that: 
"There are grave disadvantages for both 
prisoners and staff in the proposal to 
concentrate the mostdifficult and 
dangerous prisoners in one •... maximum 
se1eurity prison." (12) 
12. Ibid, at p.79 
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( 1) 
SECTION (6) PAREMOREMO 1969-1973 
(1) 1969 
The transfer of inmates to Paremoremo began in 
March, 1969. At a Penal Group meeting on May 5, 1969 
it was reported that: 
" The inmates appeared much more 
relaxed and the new institution offers 
more freedom of movement and of con-
versation. The staff also appear more 
relaxed and are showing more of a 
positive attitude than was apparent 
at Mount Eden." (2) 
This relaxed atmosphere at Paremoremo ended 
abruptly in October, when 80 prisoners at the 
institution went on strike. The strike arose following 
a dispute over the amount the prisoners were allowed 
to spend "on Christmas fare". 
On November 19, a modified toy pistol, believed to 
be capable of holding .22 calibre ammunition, was 
found in a workshop at the Prison. The Police believed 
the weapon was to have been used in an attempted armed 
break-out. 
Later on in the month, two prisoners assaulted 
three prison officers. The assault followed a refusal 
1. The incidents chronic l ed in this section have been 
taken from newspaper reports. It is therefore highly 
probable that these reported incidents represent 
only the tip of the iceberg. One wonders how many 
more incidents occurred which never made the front 
pages of the newspapers. 
2. Minutes of the Penal Group Meeting, May 5, 1969. 
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by the two prisoners to obey orders by the officers 
to move back into their cells. The prisoners attacked 
the officers, knocking them to the ground. one of 
the officers suffered a suspected broken nose and 
black eyes in the assault. 
In the 1970 Annual Report, Mr. Missen referred 
to the incidents wh ic h had occurred at Paremoremo: 
"The concept of the Auckland Prison 
was so completely new to the New 
Zealand scene that it broughtits 
problems of adjustment. Its spacious-
ness, its amenties, and its longer 
hours of unlock were appreciated by 
most of the inmates, but towards the 
end of the year a handful of trouble-
makers created strife which culminated 
in a strike. This was short lived 
and it was evident that the great 
majority of the inmates would gladly 
have no part in it." 
(2) 1970 
During the first half of 1970 there were frequent 
assaults on prison officers, and the morale of the 
staff at the prison dropped. 
In August, 1970 an attack on a prison officer 
prompted the Paremoremo Prison Officers Sub-Committee 
to call for an inquiry into the management of the 
prison. The Sub-Committee cited as their main reason, 
assaults on officers, an offical policy of lax 
discipline and wilful damage to property within the 
jail by inmates. 
of assaults on: 
The officers blamed the frequency 
" an obvious lack of discipline 
engendered by the permissive attitude 
adopted toward the inmates ... Appease-
ment is the general practice and, 
although this may avoid major trouble, 
it is not conducive to discipline or 
the self respect which it is our job 
to help inmates to acquire." (3) 
3. Reported in the Evening Post, August 11, 1970 
7 7. 
on October 12, a riot occurred at the prison. 
Ten prisoners knocked a warder unconscious, seized 
three other officers as hostaqes, and barricaded · 
themselves in part of D Block (which contained the 
most troublesome and difficult prisoners). The 
officers were eventually released after the prison 
administration had acceded to some of the inmates' 
demands. 
. d ( 4) The Tribune commente 
"Security-wise, Paremoremo is 
a giant leap ahead in protecting 
the public from dangerous criminals, 
but whether the advance has made for 
a penal policy less soul destroying 
or more geared to rehabilitation 
than was possible in the dungeons 
of Mount Eden, must now be open to 
serious question. In its first 16 
months of operation, Paremoremo 
has seen no less than 25 acts of 
violence on members of the staff -
hardly indicative of a happy 
therapeutic atmosphere. 
Last week's revolt brought things to 
a head." 
Following the riot, new security measures in 
D Block were announced by the Minister of Justice, 
Mr. Riddiford: 
" D Block, which held the most 
difficult inmates, would now be 
divided into two groups. 
Those on the upper landing would 
be allowed out of their cells at 
certain times between the hours of 
8 a.m. and 5 p.m. only. 
Those on the lower landing would 
have more liberal hours of 'unlock', 
but the inmates of both groups would 
4.The Tribune, October 18, 1970 
be moved singly and then only 
when three officers were present. 
To facilitate movement within the 
block and to permit of some 
association of inmates, additional 
sally-ports would be installed." (5) 
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(3) 1971 
In April, it was reported that the prison officers 
at Paremoremo were dismayed at the delay in installing 
new security measures at the prison. 
quoted as saying that: 
one officer was 
"Unless these measures are 
introduced very soon, there's going 
to be a lot of trouble in the (D) 
Block." (6) 
on October 19, three inmates tried to overpower 
four prison officers and take control of a cell block. 
However, they were quickly subdued and order was 
restored. 
In November, there were a number of incidents 
at Paremoremo. On November 8, the prisoners in D 
Block, in retaliation for the banning of two visitors 
from the prison, refused to work. They intimated 
that a hunger strike would begin on November 16, unless 
visiting rights were restored to the banned visIDtors. 
In a press release several days later, the Minister 
of Justice referred to incidents at the prison: 
5. 
6. 
"Because of the hostage incident, 
additional security measures were 
introduced to guarantee staff security. 
Inmates had retaliated against this 
tiglter control by a series of 
demonstrations aimed at attracting 
public sympathy. These had included 
refusing work, lighting fires, flooding 
their cells with water from the built-in 
toilets and washbasins, attacks upon 
Reported in the Evening Post, October 21, 1970 
Evening Post, April 5, 1971 
• 
staff, brief hunger strikes and 
wilful damage to fittings." 
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This increasing incidence of rioting and general 
unrest, which had led to considerable public unease, 
culminated in late 1971 in the appointment of a Visiting 
Justice (Mr. L.G.H. Sinclair) to investigate conditions 
at the prison. At the same time the Ombudsman had 
received a number of complaints from prisoners and 
others concerning the conditions at Paremoremo. 
(4) 1972 
In January, 1972 Sir Guy Powles and Mr. Sinclair 
issued their report into "various Matters Pertaining 
to Paremoremo Prison ". Some of the more important 
findings of the Report were : <7 > 
(i) The existence of D Block was considered to be 
justified. The Report thought that it was 
necessary within a prison such as Paremoremo to 
segregate under stricter security conditions 
that small group of inmates who were liable to 
be unpredictably violent,could become uncontrollable 
at times, and could have a distu~bing effect on the 
other men in the prison . 
(ii) The authors of the report were concerned at the 
tension within the prison. The report stated: 
" it is our impression ... that 
there is a morale problem in the 
staff and a morale problem in the 
inmates and one cannot be resolved 
without the other." 
Furthermore, the report found that there was a 
severe shortage of qualified staff: 
7. Some of the major points covered in the Report have 
been dealt with elsewhere. 
(iii) 
II . we feel that the root 
cause of trouble at Paremoremo is 
shortgage of qualified staff." 
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One important conclusion reached by the authors 
was that there should be a psychiatrist attached 
to the prison. The authors were impressed by 
the number of men who, to their lay minds, 
appeared to need psychiatric advice and counselling. 
(iv) The Report considered that too many medium (or 
less) security risks were confined in Paremoremo. 
This has been discussed earlier. 
(v) The Report was critical of the delays in transferring 
inmates out of Paremoremo to less secure 
institutions: 
"The delays are too long - upwards 
of many months. There are more than 
a dozen men in Paremoremo awaiting 
such a transfer. Some of these may now 
be lost to society because of this 
delay .... " 
On February 5, 1972 Mr. J. Hobson replaced Mr. E 
Buckley as Superintendent of Paremoremo. The D Block 
inmates refused meals for seven days to 'greet' Mr. 
Hobson in his new appointment. 
On June 24, more than 30 inmates staged a sit-down 
strike. The next day, six men in D Block refused to 
return to their cells and made it apparent that they 
were going to make a determined stand. The inmates 
brought mattresses out into the corridors to act as 
a shield and armed themselves with various weapons, 
including broomsticks and chair legs. After a five 
or six minute scuffle with prison officers, the inmates 
were locked in their cells. Several prisoners were 
injured, one receiving lacerations to the skull. One 
81 
prison officer suffered a broken skull. 
On June 29, it was reported that efforts to 
return Paremoremo to a state of normalcy had been 
interrupted by a fire in one of the cell blocks. 
On September 1, seven D Block inmates went on 
a hunger strike. 
The rash of incidents at Paremoremo provoked much 
soul-searching within the Justice Department. The 
Secretary of Justice initiated an investigation of the 
possibility of using part of Paremoremo for medium security 
inmates. In August, 1972 Mr. Missen reported to the 
Minister of Justice that: 
" a very careful investigation has 
been made of the possibility of using one 
or more cell blocks for medium security 
purposes. I have come to the conclusion 
that such a course would be impracticable. 
The security of the whole institution 
would be seriously affected with the 
consequent risk of escapes and danger 
to the public. Furthermore, there 
would be no reasonable way of attempting 
to use the insutution for medium security 
without very costly modifications." 
In a press release the following month, the 
Minister of Justice, Sir Roy Jack, conclusively quashed 
the suggestion of using one or mor~ of the cell blocks 
for medium security purposes: 
"The unavoidable contact between maximum 
and medium security inmates would mean 
that the security of the whole institution 
would be seriously affected with a 
consequent risk of escapes and danger to 
the public. Paremoremo was built against 
the background of manifest deficiencies of 
Mount Eden Prison as New Zealand's top 
security prison and public alarm at 
recurring escapes. One of the major 
problems at Mount Eden had been the fact 
that it was required to fulfill a maximum 
and medium security role (T)o 
introduce a similar concept at Paremoremo 
would be to recreate the unsatisfactory 
situation that formerly existed at Mount 
Eden.~· 
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on November 13, an escape attempt from 
Paremoremo was foiled. 
on November 25, the Evening Post reported that 
"A total of 26 prisoners in 
Paremoremo Prison has been isolated 
from others in the institution 
following fires, threats of violence, 
and the escape attempt .. The recent 
outbreak of disturbances began when 
prisoners went on a rampage in one 
of the stores, shredding 40 pairs of 
white shirts and pants which they wear 
when receiving visitors." 
In December, the Minister of Justice, or. 
Finlay, ordered a further investigation of Parernorerno. 
(5) 1973 
In March, the second Powles/Sinclair report 
was released. The Report concluded that Paremoremo 
Prison must, with all its unfortunate built-in 
difficulties, be kept as it is, used for its intended 
purposes. and operated as best it can be. This view 
was reached after consideration of an alternative 
providing for the reclassifimtion of Paremoremo from 
maximum to medium security and the transfer of major 
trouble-makers and security risks to a smaller maximum 
security institution. 
The Report also considered two alternatives 
to retaining D Block as at present - increasing its 
isolation within the prison or entirely separating 
it physically. The report felt that the first alternative 
though it would minimise disruption, would not eliminate 
entirely the influence inmates in this block were capable 
of exerting. Of the other alternative, the report said 
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it had insufficient knowledge of the extent of 
the country's prison population and no knowledge 
at all of projected figures for the future. The 
Report therefore recommended that D Block be accepted 
as it was, subject to the principle that no man 
should remain there indefinitely. 
The Report also considered that rehabilitation in 
a prison such as Paremoremo was extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, within the present programme. 
"We are inclined to wonder if any 
programme of rehabilitation that is 
at all worthy of the name can 
function in such a closed and 
secure environment. The incentives 
to conform hardly exist at all, 
particularly since the policy of 
progression has been halted and 
privileges curtailed ... We will go 
further and say that there is little 
more than a minimal programme of 
rehabilitation at Paremoremo." 
In the 1973 Annual Report, the Secretary of 
,T 
Justice applauded the results of the inquiry: 
"Another Powles/Sinclair report has 
been presented. The purpose for which 
Paremoremo was designed and built as 
New Zealand's one maximum security prison 
has been affirmed; the administration of 
thesuperintendent, Mr. Hobson, has been 
vindicated; moves towards a more relaxed 
regime for the small group of inmates held 
in the tightest security block are shown 
to have been vitiated by those inmates 
themselves. 
The report highlights the inherent 
difficulties in moving towards reform in 
prisons administration and particularly 
in balancing maximum security with the 
insistent goal of rehabilitation." 
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Conclusion: 
Fires, riots, assaults on staff, hunger strikes -
all these factors have characterised Paremoremo as an 
inherently troublesome institution. Something must be 
done to alter the very nature of the institution if 
it is to enjoy a relatively troublefree life. 
Recently, the prison has settled down and the 
number of incidents have decreased. How long this state 
of affairs will last is anyone's guess. That this may 
well be the lull before the storm was recognised by Mr. 
Missen, when he stated in the 1973 Annual Report 
that: 
"Experiences here and abroad indicates 
that it would be quite unrealistic to 
think that the resolution of present 
difficulties will mean an end to upsets in 
the prison." 
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